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Joreword 
Only within the last century, apparently, has any serious 
study been made of the Jewish philosopher,·- Elilo. Just why 
a man of such ingenuity and 1ntelligenoe should be relegated 
to the background is not clear. ·Ferhaps, it is because Philo 
occupies a unique position in the progfess of human thought. 
On the one hand, he was a philosopher • . Yet, because his 
philosophy lacks originality, and because he uses it so 
arbitrarily, he cannot be classed among the world's great 
philosophers. On the other hand, Philo was, in a sense, 
a theologian. He was a devout Jew and, as such, had a high 
regard for the Old Testament Scriptures, particularly, the 
writings of Moses. It was his avowed purpose to commend the 
sacred Scriptures to the Greek world. And yet, because of 
his over-emphasis on allegory, he canno·t be regarded as a 
serious interpreter of Scripture, for it is difficult to 
understand a man who would cast aside the obvious meaning or 
a Scriptural passage in favor of such an exaggerated use of 
allegory. Strictly speaking, then, Fhilo's system is neither 
philosophy nor theology; it is a mixture of elements from 
both. 
But because his doctrine of the Logos is the center ot 
his system, a study of Philo commends itself to every advanced 
Bible student. For this reason also we have 1n the following 
pages payed particular attention to Philo's Logos concept. 
We have made no special attempt to evaluate Philo's theology. 
- 11 ._ 
Nor 1s it within the scope of this thesis to draw parallels 
between Philo and the works of later Christian writers. That 
is a study 1n itselt. 
Al+ aouroea and material used are listed in the bibliography. 
The references to Philo's works are based on the Colson and 
Whitaker ed1t19n (Greek and English), the Roman numerals 
indicating the book 1n the treatise, the Arabio numbers denoting 
the particular paragraph. 
Finally, we wish to express our appreciation to 
Prof. A. M. Rehwinkel and Dr. Paul Bretscher, under whose 
helpful direction this thesis 'Was written, and whose interest 
in the project provided us real encouragement. 
st. Louis, Missouri, 
May 15, 1943 
Roland A. Frantz 
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I 
Philo and Alexandrian Thought 
Following the conquests of Alexander the Great, the 
city of Alexandr.ia became one of' the chief' centers of' 
intellectual and cfomm.ercial activity. It was the great 
world conqueror's purpose to make that city the greatest 
city in the world. His suooessors, the Ptolemies, fulfilled 
this purpose • . Alexandria became the site of' a great museum, 
a library containing, at a very conservative estimate, 
400,000 volumes, a famous light-house, but of more importance, 
the center or Greek culture and philosophy. 
Numerous Jews migrated to Egypt under the Ptolemies 
because of the cordial treatment they received in addition 
to the grant of full citizenship. It is estimated that at 
Philo's time about a million Jews inhabited Egypt. Also in 
Alexandria, the Jewish citizenry must have been very large, 
It 1s said that the synagogue there was so immense that an 
official standing on a platform had to weve his head-cloth 
or veil to inform the people at the back of the edifice when 
to say "Amen" in response to the reader.' Naturally the Jews 
brought with them their Torah and their tradition. 
Now, it is evident, that the fusion of' Greek and Jewish 
1. Norman Bentwich, Philo Judaeus of' Alexandria, p. 16 
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ideas was inevitable in Egypt. The Jews there, in spite ot 
their exclusive tendencies, could hardly expect to remain 
aloof and absolutely untouched by the secular Gentile culture 
surrounding them. For one thing, there was the influence of 
the Greek language. Within a hundred years or their settle-
ment 1n Alexandria, Hebrew and Aramaic had become "foreign" 
languages to the Jews, for they were gradually compelled to 
speak the Greek. 
But Hellenism had a far more pervasive influence upon 
the Egyptian Jews. Not only was their daily life, their 
culture affected, but the Jews soon began to feel the forces 
of Hellenism encroaching upon their religion. It meant that 
because few could read or understand the Hebrew, it was 
necessary to have a Greek translation of the Holy Scriptures. 
Out of this n~cessity arose the Septuagint translation, begun 
during the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus, about 250 B.C. 
Surrounded by pagan Egyptian and Greek cults, it is not 
surprising that the more liberal-minded Jews began to be 
influenced by heathenism. No more were they in the comparative 
safety and solitude of Palestine, where outside influence was 
not as great, but they we,re now surrounded by people who had 
a different philosophy of life, who lived and who thought 
differently. And the more liberal minded became interested 
and curious to become acquainted with this new philosophy. 
Nor was it only the more liberal minded who were thus affected. 
The or,thodox and faithful sons of Abraham also desired to lmow 
what Greek and Egyptian religion was like, because, still 
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conscious of their position as God's chosen people and 
therefore the possessors of divine truth, they realized 
the opportunity that confronted them of proving to the 
Gentiles the superiority of their own religion. 
Yet aside from these factors, Judaism 1n general, be 
it the liberal kind or the orthodox, could not escape 
Hellenizing influences in their ~eligion. By the very 
nature ot Greek culture and thought, which is attractive 
to the cultured, contemplative mind, a fertile field was 
furnished the curious mind. The Jews began to study G~eek 
philosophy and to use the phrases of philosophy, so that 
before long philosophy was interwoven with their religion. 
Particularly, those parts 0f their doctrines which apparently 
had some outward resemblance to Greek speculation gradually 
came to be identified. 
But the amalgamation of these two systems of thought 
involved reciprocal tendencies. Judaism did not lose its 
identity completely, nor was it the passive element- in the 
fusion of Greek and Hebrew thought. The Jews never, either 
as a result of subtle influence or by forceful persuasion, 
gave ~P their monotheism and their venera tion for Moses and 
the prophets. As a matter of ta.ct, the Greeks, in Egypt, 
too, could not escape the influence which the Jews had on 
them. Greeks and Romans becarne acquainted with Jewish 
beliefs and customs. It is believed that religion influenced 
Greek philosophy perhaps to as great a degree as religion 
itself ~as influenoed by Greek speculation. The whole 
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Neo-f!la ten-io · sys.tem1- -wh1ch--was -a- -la ter.--deveJ.Oi.)men-t ,· . was .. . .. .. _ . . 
essent1al~y a religious philosophy, while Alexandrian theology 
was really a philosophical religion. A reason for the suscepti-
bility of Greek thought to Hebrew religion is suggested by 
Bentwich, who remarks that the Greek world was at this time 
losing faith in the "poetical gods of its mythology and in 
the metaphysical powers of its philosophical schools," and 
was searching for something more real and reliable. It was 
attracted to Judaism, for in the place of the gods of nature, 
or the impersonal world force, the Jews offered them the God 
of history.~ At any rate, the evident conviction on the part 
of the Jews regarding their own religion must have been an 
influence on the Greeks. 
The task to which Jewish philosophers set themselves, 
then, was this - to harmonize Greek philosophy with Jewish 
monotheism. Their purpose was, first of all, to strengthen 
the Alexandrian Jews themselves, who had undoubtedly begun 
to entertain many doubts and were on the verge of apostasy, 
and, secondly, to adapt the sacred Scriptures to the Greek 
world. From the very outset, the task of reconciling two 
such opposing systems was almost a hopeless one, although 
the Jewish philosophers believed they had accomplished this 
by the use of allegory. Allegorical interpr~tation formed 
the basis of the whole Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy. Thus, 
the Jews could interpret their sacred Scriptures in terms 
2. Bentwich, op. cit., p.33. 
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of philosophy. Ot course, a real harmony never was effected, 
but the result was a new method ot exegesis, wh1ch, in turn, 
produced a peculiar kind of literature. 
Probably the first step in this Jewish-Hellenistic develop-
ment was the Septuagint version of the Bible, which permitted 
Jew and Greek to meet on common ground. The first of the 
Alexandrians to use allegorical interpretation for the purpose 
of harmonizing Greek ideas with the Bible is believed to be 
Aristobulus. The authenticity of his writings is disputed, 
but he is supposed to have written about the beginning of the 
first century B.C. Other products of the Jewish-Alexandrian 
philosophy were the Letter of Aristeas, written about ·100 B.c., 
which pretends to give an account of the origin of the 
Septuagint translation, the Wisdom of Solomon, the Syb1lline 
Oracles, etc. In all these works the object was to present 
the God of the Jews as the only true God, and to show that 
all philosophy was really dependent upon Judaism. 
It remained tor Philo to put the finishing touches to 
the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy. In him the whole develop-
ment of Jewish-Greek thought reached its culmination. He was 
its most distinguished representative. In his hands, allegory, 
for the purpose of enabling the Jew and the Greek to under-
stand each other, reached its highest development. Philo even 
believed he had a sacred mission to interpret the Scriptures 
to the Greeks. A great part or the Jewish-Hellenistic 
literature is believed to have been lost, but in Philo's 
works we have the full development or this period. Thus, 
I 
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Philo's works are more than the expression of an individual 
mind; they are, in fact, "the record and expression ot a 
great culture."3 Although not developing a complete system, 
and though he himself is often vague and even contradictory 
in his teachings, he clearly shows the tendency of his age. 
In the final analysis, then, it would be difficult to under-
stand the position of such a man, particularly, wh~n he him-
self is inconsistent. But, perhaps we can arrive at some 
general conception of his more apparent conclusions. That 
Philo was extremely versatile cannot be denied, for he 
touches upon innumerable subjects in the fields of philosophy, 
science, politics, religion, law, psychology and ethics. 
or Philo's life we know very little. In fact, concerning 
only one incident do we have any definite information, namely, 
his mission to Rome. The precise year of his birth is not 
known, but scholars are generally agreed that he was born 
between 10 and 20 B.c., probably nearer the latter date. He 
was a resident of the great city of Alexandria, belonging to 
one of the most distinguished and wealthiest Jewish families 
or the city. It is a question, however, whether or not he 
was of the priestly rank. Opinion is divided on this matter 
and we cannot be sure. Even if this distinction were conceded 
to him, it is doubtful whether such a distinguishing mark 
would carry great prestige in the Hellenized city of Alexandria. 
3. Bentwioh, op. cit., p. 77. 
I 
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His brother, Alexander Lysimachus,f one ot the foremost and 
wealthiest men in the Jewish community, was magistrf\te and 
alabaroh, or chief farmer of taxes on the Arabian side ot the 
Nile. It is said that at one time he lent Herod Agrippa two 
hundred thousand draohmae, and that the gold and silver plates 
covering the nine gates of the temple at Jerusalem were the 
gift of Alexander.~ Furthermore, Alexander's two sons seem to 
have followed in the socially prominent footsteps of their 
father, for the one, Marcus, was married to Berenice, the 
daughter of Herod, and the other, Tiberius Julius Alexander, 
having deserted his religion, ventured upon a political career, 
which elevated him from a general in Egypt to Roman procurator 
in Palestine, and finally to a position immediately below 
Titus." 
Although of' such a wealthy and influential family, Philo 
himself was not attracted by wealth or politics, but was of a 
studious, contemplative disposition. Yet it is rather ironical 
to learn that the only incident of' his life about which there 
are some details, is an incident which involves him in a 
serious political situation. That event was his journey to 
Rome, in the year 40 A.D., as the head of' an embassy of tive, 
to plead the case of his people before the emperor G'e.ius 
Caligula. According to the decree of the emperor, his own 
4. In his History of Israel, Ewald questions this relation-
ship between Philo and Alexander, contending that, according to 
newly discovered passages, Alexander was Philo's nephew. But 
more recent scholars make no mention of these "newly discovered 
passages" and regard the two men as brothers. 
5. Erwin Goodenough, An Introduction to Philo Judaeus, p.3. 
6. Ibid.' P• 4. f.tR.ITZLAFF 1-·11:: ~OP.IAL LIBRA-RY 
CONCO: :· \ :.: · 1 :1~ARY 
ST. LC UlS, .3;10, 
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. statue was to be plaoed in all Jewish temples, and was to be 
~orshipped. This the Jews refused to do, and, as a result, 
they wer.e p·erseouted. When it was deoided that a speoial 
~mbassy should be sent to Rome to ask that the Jews be exempted 
from paying the ~mperor divine honors, Philo, no .doubt beoause 
of his great reputation and patriotism, was ohosen at the head. 
The mission was unsuocesstul. Phi-lo and his colleagues were 
mocked and made sport ot, Ph1lo'e brother was thrown into 
prison { to be re.leased later by Claudius .wh.ose friendship he 
had gained), and the rest of them fled. For a man so devoted 
to his people and to their tradition, this must have been a 
bitter disappointment for Philo, and we are, perhaps, sate in 
assuming that some of those treatises in which he attacks the 
Gentiles, were written after, and were the result ot., this 
shameful treatment on the part of Caligula. From now on, says 
Bentwich, "he was the public defender as well as the teacher 
of his people." 7 
Now upon the dating or this event in the year 40 A.D., to 
which historians agree, is based the chronology of Philo's 
life, as well as the apparent change in his outlook on lite. 
In a treatise describing the ~vents of A.D. 40 he speaks ot 
' himself as an old man ( {E.ewv ) , and from this 1 t is oonjeotured 
that he was born about 20 B.c. As to the date ot his death, 
it is also assumed that he died about the year 50 A.D. At 
least, this is aocepted by most writers. In Jewish history, 
,:·Bentwioh, op. oit., P• 45. 
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then, Philo's lite was contemporaneous with the reigns of 
King Herod, his sons, and King Agrippa. He was al~o partly 
contemporary with .Hillel, who came from Babylon to Jerusalem 
in 30 .B.O. The period ot his teaching is practically simul-
taneous with that of Jesus, .John the Baptist, and partly with 
the life of Paul. or the rest of Philo's life we have no 
authentic info~mation. 
As to his personal character and way of lite we are 
entirely dependent upon passages taken from his own writings, 
and even from these we learn very little, tor Philo was not 
given to speak or himself. But an occasional passage reveals 
the type ot person that he was. Already from his early youth 
Philo devoted himself to a life of contemplation and study. 
In spite of his being born under wealthy and socially prominent 
circumstances, he spurned love of the world and devoted himself 
to philosophy. He regarded it as man's highest duty to study 
the Law and to strive to know God. We shall point out later 
how this was to be accomplished. But it should be remarked 
here that there is a two-fold stage in Philo's approach to 
this attainment of righteousness. In his early days Philo 
regarded the way to virtue and happiness to lie in the solitary 
and ascetic life. He looked upon the world and society as evil, 
so that man should flee from these things it he would know God. 8 
Accordingly, he spent his youth and early manhood in studying 
a~ While Philo was in sympathy with ascetic ideas and 
habits, especially those of the Essenes, and although he speaks 
of a Jewish brotherhood of ascetics living alone near the mouth 
of the Nile, he now~ere says that he belonged to their society. 
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philosophy and in contemplating the universe. 
But, apparently, in his maturity Philo reversed h1mselt. 
He no longer regarded as~eticism as the ideal way of lite, but 
looked ~p~n moderation as the road to righteousness. This 
dualism in his point of view, this conflict between the 
contemplative and the practical life, is best seen trom his 
own words. In one pa!3sage he says of himself: 
"There was a time when I had leisure for philosophy 
and for the contemplation of the universe and its 
contents, when I made its spirit my own in all its 
beauty and loveliness and true blessedness, when 
my constant companions were divine themes and 
verities, wherein I rejoiced with a joy that never 
cloyed or sated. I had no base or abject thoughts 
nor grovelled in search or reputation or of wealth 
or bodily comforts, but seemed always to be borne 
aloft into the heights with a soul possessed by 
some God-sent inspiration, a fellow-traveller with 
the sun and moon and the whole heaven and universe •. " 'I 
In another place he says: 
"For many a time have I myself forsaken friends and 
kinsfolk and country and came into a wilderness, to 
give my attention to some subject demanding 
contemplation, and derived no advantage from doing 
so, but my mind scattered or bitten by passion has 
gone o~f to matters of tµe contrary kind. Sometimes, 
on the other hand, amid a vast throng I have a 
collected mind. God has dispersed the crowd that 
besets the soul and taught me that a favourable and 
unfavourable condition ar~ not brought about by 
difference ot place, but by God who moves and leads 
the car ot the soul 1n whatever way He pleases." 10 
It may well be that the fortunes of his fellow-Jews in 
Alexandria, their persecution and hardships, contributed to 
this reversal of attitude and to his involvement in publ1o 
affairs, tor he was truly a Jew devoted to his people. But 
a. The Special Laws, III, l. 
10. Allegorical Interpretation, II, 85. 
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whatever the cause may be, it is obvious that he did experience 
a change or attitude. The solitary, contemplative life emerged 
into the social and active life. Nevertheless, Philo was far 
from giving up his contemplation and ~peculation even in his 
later years, .for, indeed, this was the way to know God. 
Be.1ng intensely interested in learning, he early acquired 
an .education in all the subjects prominent in his day. Because 
or his family's wealth, and because the city or Alexandria was 
then the chief center of the world's wisdom, Philo had unusual 
opportunities for education. He busied himself with all 
branches of learning, becoming acquainted with Greek, Egyptian, 
Chaldean, Persian and even Indian thought. He studied, and 
. 
became well versed in, all the prominent schools ot philosophy 
of his day - Platonic, stoic, Skeptic and Pythagorean. It is 
said, he became "the most distinguished Platonist of his age,"" 
and oan be regarded as "representative of the best attainments 
of the J'udeanism of that age." 1~ 
But Philo was more than a pedantic intellectual. He was 
sincere, was devoted to Scripture and to the welfare of his 
people, and he loved virtue. While he was, .by and large, not 
an ascetic, neither did he countenance hilarious living. He 
disapproved of the ostentation of Alexandrian society, and he 
rebukes the idolatry of the Egyptians. His advice was to avoid 
the t:wo extremes and to choose the middle course, the way of 
temperance and virtue.13 Philo was truly a · man of high moral 
11. Bentwioh, op. cit., P• 48. 
12. Georg Ewald, History of Israel, Vol. VII, p. 195. 
13. It 1s true, this does not agree with his earlier views, 
but I think we are justified in regarding his more mature outlook 
on life as rep~esentative ot the man. 
,. 
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character, and his devotion to the Law and to the Scriptures 
is hard to match. In his views on practical life it 1s some-
times amazing to note the outwar.d resemblance to Christian 
principles. ~!oreover, simplicity of 11:te was evidently 
emulated by Philo's wife. The story is told that, when asked 
why she, who was so rich, did not wear the costly ornaments 
and jewelry peculiar to her social standing, replied. "The 
virtue of the ·husband is adornment enough for the wite."'"' 
Although living in Alexandria practically all his lite, 
Philo is known to have made .one other journey outside Egypt, 
besides his trip to Rome. In his treatise De Providentia he 
speaks of going to Jerusalem to worship - as every faithful 
Jew was wont to do. This probably occurred about 30 A~n~, 
during the reign of Agrippa, who was a personal friend of 
Philo's family.,., 
As far as his outward life and circumstances are concerned, 
this is about all we know of ,Philo. But of his thoughts and 
attitudes and convictions we learn more from his writings. In 
fact, as we study the nature of his works and observe the methoi 
of his approach, Philo emerges as a man of many aspects. He is 
a profound, though not always a Qonsistent, thinker, and his 
writings have assumed voluminous proportions. It is believed 
that those works which are extant form only about one half of 
his total writings. 
In order to understand Philo at all, one must understand 
14. Heinrich Graetz, History ot the Jews, Vol. II, p~ 186. 
15. Bentwich, op. cit., P• so. 
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his method of interpretation. To Philo, allegory was the key 
which unlooked the Scriptures. To be sure, he was not the 
first to employ allegory, but he certainly gave it new importance. 
It is perhaps not saying too much to remark that under Philo 
allegory was used as it had never been used before. 
When we think of the task to which Philo addressed himself, 
we begin to ·s~e why allegory played such a prominent part in 
his system, yes, why it was the center and core of his system. 
Philo was essentially a Jew. He regarded the Old Testament, 
especially the Mosaic Law, as the supreme authority, venerating 
it "as if it were God." He adhered strictly to the inspiration 
of the Holy Scripture, ree'}lrding every word, every .letter as 
divinely inspired. For him, Moses was the supreme philosopher 
and law-giver of the world. Accordingly, the Greek philosophers 
and poets were but "broken lights" of Mose.a. Thus, in Philo' s 
estimation the Pentateuch was the source of the highest wisdom, 
and while the other Old Testament writers were also inspired, 
they were merely disciples ot Moses. 
On the other hand, Philo was a Greek philosopher, having 
w beoome acquainted \1th, and holding in high esteem, the 
prominent philosophies of the day, esp_eoially, that ot Plato. 
In fact, he thought so much of Plato and borrowed so extensively 
from him, that it has been said, "either Philo Platonizes or 
Plato Philonizes." But inasmuch as he borrowed freely from 
several other philosophic systems, notably the Pythagorean and 
stoic, he is very properly called an eolectio. 
Philo's task was to reconcile Greek philosophy and culture 
- 14 -
with traditional Jewish faith. His purpose was two-told. In 
the first place, he wanted to show that between taith and 
philosophy there was no conflict and, secondly, he wi~hed to 
establish the Torah as well as Judaism on a firm foundation 
for the edification of the man of outside culture. The result 
was that "to the Greek world he offered a philosophic religion, 
to his own .people a reiigious philosophy."'' 
But was it possible to accomplish this task? Could a 
divine revelation be harmonized with human speculat~on? Could 
monotheism be reconciled with polytheism? Philo believed he 
found the answer. True to his Jewish faith, he subordinated 
Greek philosophy to the Hebrew Scriptures, and with the 
instrument of allegory he worked out his doctrines. His premise 
is that the Greek philosophers borrowed from the Old Testament 
and from Moses. He attempts . to show that whatever good is 
found in the Greek philosophemes was nothing original, but 
that, on the contrary, Moses had taught it · long ago. Yet, 
I think, it would be more correct to say that, actually, Philo 
borrowed many of his doctrines from the Greeks and, using 
Scripture in a very loose way, tried to create the impression 
that the Greeks borrowed them from Moses. 
However. _Philo's task was a rather hopeless one, and no 
matter how sincere and earnest may have been his effort at 
harmonizing these two modes of thought, "the amalgamation is 
somewhat external and incomplete.«/7 Philo was striving to 
16. Bentwioh~ op. cit., P• 96. 
17. Edward Oaird, The Evolution ot Theology: in the Greek 
Philosophers, Vol. II, P• 190. 
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reconcile opposites. As Oal~d has put it, "the Hebrew mind 18 
. . 
intuitive, imaginative, almost incapable of' analysis or ot 
systematic connection of. ideas", while "the Greek mind, on the 
other hand, is essentially discursive; analytical, and system-
atic, governing itself even in its highest flights by the ideas 
of measure and. symmetry, of logical sequence. and connection."'' 
These two divergent systems of thought -- the one, ~eason, the 
other, revelation -- Philo tried to reconcile. While a general 
failure to attain this objective was, by the very nature or the 
c.ircumstances, precluded, Philo saw no difficulty in his attempt, 
and actually worked out a detailed system. By the use of' 
allegory he believed he found the answer. 
Yet, while the method of allegory was a highly serviceable 
instrument in the approach to the problem, it was, actually a 
necessary instrument. It was, perhaps, the only vehicle which 
could convey Greek thought to the Jewish mind and vice versa. 
And so, allegorical exposition became almost a necessity with 
Philo, so that "had he not already found it in use, he would 
doubtless have invented it."11 
Philo's general principle is that, in addition to the 
literal meaning for the common man, the Bible has a hidden and 
deeper meaning for the philosopher. Not everyone is able to go 
beneath the surface and learn the true meaning; only the man 
who is practiced in philosophy and meditation can do this. Thus, 
s cripture is a sort of palimpsest. In studying the Scripture, 
18. Ibid., P. 188ft. 
19. Graetz, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 210. 
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one should give heed, not only to the words and terms, but 
to the spirit of the writings, because the true meaning lies 
under the surface, and words are only a means of conveyance 
7"I 
aoco~odating to man. On this point Philo says: 
"We should look on all these outward observances as 
resembl.ing the body, and their inner meanings as 
resembling the soul. It follows that, exactly as 
we have to take thought for the body, because it is 
the abode of the soul, so we must pay heed to the 
letter of the laws. If we keep and observe these, 
we shall gain a clearer conception of those things 
of which these are symbols. 11 .io 
That his method lacked system and consistency seems to be 
of no concern to Philo. He employs it at his own pleasure, so 
that it becomes an instrument by which he can deduce anything 
from anything. In fact, it is so flexible, that he is known 
to take a certain passage and deduce different ideas from the 
same terms, or to apply wholly different terms to the same 
idea. In reality, his own practice is inconsistent with his 
theory, for, on the one hand, he firmly believes in the verbal 
i nspiration of Scriptures, whose teachings contain the highest 
and ultimate truth, while, on the other hand, because of his 
preconceived notions, he introduces foreign matters into the 
text of scripture, which render verbal i nspiration null and 
void, and thus he becomes involved in a vicious circle. 
Moreover, he feels free at any time to take a Hebrew name or 
word, substitute some supposed Greek equivalent, and then 
ramble on in his exposition. In itself this is certainly a 
dangerous and misleading method. But when a man of Philo's 
ingenuity and imagination employs such a method of 
20. On The Migration of Abraham, 93 
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interpretation, we are not surprised at the tar-fetch~d and, 
at times, nonsensical thoughts that are deduced. 
The d1ff1cul.ty now arises, how, if the very words of the 
Hebrew text are inspired, can we be sure that the Gr~ek text 
has caught the meaning. For Philo this was no problem, 
because he regarded the LXX also as verbally inspired.~' 
Inspiration was ascribed to the translators even in the choice 
of words, and hence, he bases all his arguments on the LXX. 
But this, too, seems to have been a necessity for Philo. 
Ignorant of, or at best, only superficially acquainted with, 
Hebrew, he was compelled to use the Greek in his study. At 
the same time he freely takes a Hebrew name and promiscuously 
substitutes some Greek term, or he interprets a Hebrew word 
according to Greek etymology. It is not surpria ·\ng then, that 
his entire treatment and application of the Bible becomes 
defective and false. It is true, he does not impress one as 
being whimsical in his approach, or indifferent to falsification, 
for he seems to have pursued his task with all seriousness, 
and apparently believed he was expounding the original and 
only true meaning. But he was unconsciously led to an 
exaggerated use of allegory. Everything in the Pentateuch, 
its historical significance being obliterated, was interpreted 
allegorically, and, as a result, personages and places became 
"the cold puppets of a mystical philosophy. ".u. l!.'Ven within 
21. It is a controversial point whether Philo had any 
knowledge of the Hebrew language. Several authorities believe 
that he was entirely ignorant of Hebrew, while the most that 
is said for him on this point is that he had a working knowledge 
of Hebrew. 
22. James Drummond, Philo Judaeus, Vol. I, p. 22. 
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Judaism, this promiscuous use of allegory threatened to 
have evil consequences, because it led to two extremes. 
Some disregarded the literal sense and began to allegorize 
away the law, including numerous ceremonial observances. 
It is even said that allegory became so general and intriguing 
that the masses lost all interest 1n the simple stories ot 
the Holy Scripture, and "took more delight in artitioial 
explanations than in the plain lessons and sublime laws ot 
their sacred books. n.23 Others adhered strictly to the literal 
sense ot Scripture and rejected allegory. Philo seems to 
have chosen the middle course, being "liberal in thought and 
conservative in practice."~¥ 
Though our religious philosopher had no definite system 
nor any definite rules regarding his allegory, he does seem 
to follow for definite reasons various principles. For one 
thing, everything anthropomorphic had to be changed into some 
spiritual or philosophic truth. He regarded it as being 
unworthy of God to speak of Hirn as having arms, a body, or as 
laughing or repenting. These were merely forms of speech for 
man's accornrnodation, but were unsuited to the Deity. Further-
more, the literal sense must ·be excluded wherever Scripture 
seems to be involved in a discrepancy, as, for exani:ple, where 
numbers or relationships 1n a particular ~amily seemingly do 
not agree. Finally, allegorical interpretation must be used 
wherever scripture seems to require it, as, for instance, when 
23. Graetz, op. oit., Vol. II, p. 209. 
24. Bentwich, op. cit., P• 40. 
..., 
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it speaks of the trees ot ·knowledge, and ot lite, or of the 
serpent speaking. ' These seem to be general principles which 
he followed in his interpretation.~'With the use of such 
principles the bars are let down and the doors are wide open 
for arbitrary and subjective interpretation. He defies the 
rules of hermeneutics and gets around this by saying that 
only the higher and more capable minds can understand the 
deep~r meanings of Scripture. Accordingly, he at times, 
offers some interesting and thought-provoking conclusions, 
but only too often he toys with the sacred Scriptures and 
deduces some fantastic explanations. Ot course, his difficulty 
lay in his purpose, with the result that "the Scriptures are 
ruthlessly robbed of their historical significance, and made 
the scaffolding for the erection of a philosophical system 
in many respects alien to their real meaning. 11.t' 
A word may be said about Philo's writings. We are 
accustomed to refer to Philo as a philosopher, but he really 
had no definite, coherent philosophic system. His purpose 
was to defend the teachings of Moses ~d to show that they 
contained the highest philosophical truth, and not to write 
a new philosophy. For that reason he never traces a 
philosophical question to its logical conclusion. Rather is 
his philosophy in the form of biblical exposition, or as 
Zeller puts it, it is "Jewish theology mixed with Greek 
25. It may be, according to Drummond, that a school or 
alle,gortoal expositors existed at Philo's time, which had 
fixed laws by which they were guided. 
26. William Fairweather, Jesus and the Greeks, p. 186 
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mysticism"f7rather than real philosophy. Taking the 
Pentateuch, he proceeds verse by verse and gives an 
exegesis of the Scriptures, all the while injecting into 
it, by means or allegory, his philosophical ideas. Thus, 
his works are nothing but philosophical commentaries on 
the books ot Moses, inasmuch as his various conceptions, 
which lie scattered up and down his writings, are all based 
on the Jewish, more particularly, the Mosaic viewpoint. 
One reason tor the laok ot consistency .in his writings, 
other than the impossibility of his task, is that he himself 
deals with Biblical material in different ways. Recalling 
that Philo really lived a double life, we are not surprised 
that the interpretations of his maturer years differed from 
those of his earliest writings. Hence, it becomes more 
difficult to understand the man. The problem would be less 
difficult, of course, if we could place the various treatises 
in the proper period~ of his life. Then, at least, we could 
come to some sort of conclusion as to how his views developed 
and what could be regarded as an established conviction. But 
since, as Bentwich remarks, "the chronology of Ph1lo's 
;.1 
writings is as uncertain as the chronology or his life," we 
shall probably never know how to interpret the man on some 
points. 
Another reason for his inconsistency in dealing with 
Biblical material is that different treatments were meant for 
27. Eduard Zeller, Outlines of the Historz of Greek 
Philosophy, p. 264. 
28. Op. cit., P• 77. 
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different audiences. In general, Philo defends his religion 
especially against three classes of opponents. First of all, 
he inveighs against the scoffers among the Jews themselves, 
those who have deserted their Jewish faith. Next, a great 
part of his writing is directed toward those within Judaism 
who were coming to admire Chaldean astrology and who were 
inclining towards Greek culture. A third portion 9f his 
writings is meant for the ordinary heathen, particularly, 
the Egyptians with their animal-worship!' Throughout his 
writings Philo maintains a dignified attitude, and he very 
rarely mentions his opponents' names. His language, too, is 
elevated and mannerly. 
29. Ewalq, op. cit., Vol. VII, P• 200ff. 
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II 
Doctrine of God 
In studying Philo's doctrine of God, we notice especially 
two points from which he proceeds, namely, the existence of 
God and the nature of God. Concerning the first point, Philo 
is deeply imbued with the conviction that God exists. To a 
devout Jew this could not be otherwise, for the sacred 
Scriptures establish this fact. And yet, for the sake or 
the heathen, Philo relies on philosophical arguments to prove 
God's existence. In the case of God's nature he 1s, for the 
most part, content to rely on the teachings of Moses. 
In Philo's day there were many theories concerning the 
existence of God. There were skeptics who doubted God's 
existence, atheists who said there was no God at all, poly-
theists who believed that many gods existed, pantheists who 
believed God to be manifested in every object. Over against 
these divergent theories Philo introduced the God of Judaism, 
and he tries to prove His existence by rational arguments.' 
In a general way, says Philo, the true God may be known 
by contemplating nature. He uses the analogy of microcosm 
and macrocosm, showing that God js in the universe in the 
same way tha t the invisible mind is in man. EVen as the mind 
rules all the parts of the body, so all the parts of the cosmos 
must be ruled by a Supreme Being. Secondly, the existence or 
God may be proved by the intuitions of the soul. For example, 
1. see his treatise, On the Creation 
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when we oontemplate art or painting, we cannot do so without 
believing that someone created that piece ot art or did that 
painting. so, too. 1n the oosmos. The multitudinous phenomena 
which we see and experience must be the work of a Creator. 
tuiother argument is that of oausality. Just as any work ot 
art cannot come about by itself, neither can 'Rs -suppose that 
the universe evolved by itself. On the contrary, there must 
have been a first cause, something whic~ gave shape and form 
to shapeless matter. Furthermore, the orderly arrangement in 
the universe suggests some law or reason acting upon it. As 
a result, Philo attributes this cause to mind.1 The Supreme 
Mind is the original cause of the universe. 
But there 1s a higher mode by which God may be apprehended. 
While ordinary men must be content with the knowledge of God 
gained indirectly, the more perfect and purified minds can 
apprehend Him through more direct manifestations; "Those who 
strove to see God from the creation were confined to conjecture; 
but those pursued the truth who perceived God by means of God, 
light by means of light."" This idea is expressed through an 
allegory of Abraham. When Scripture says that Abraham left 
his c-ountry, and his kindred and his father's house{ this, 
according to Philo, means that he put off the body, sensible 
perception, and speech, so that only when the bodily things 
... 
2. Yov.s 
3. This distinction between superior and inferior minds 
will be discussed under the doctrine of man. 
4. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 5. 
5. Genesis 12, lff. 
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were cast aside did God appear to h1m.• In other words, the 
higher lite, the lite that is removed from the busy w:,rld 
to solitude and retirement and has conquered the senses --
that is the life that attains to a more direct knowledge ot 
God. In this doctrine that the highest intuition, the 
spiritual intuition, is capable of seeing God, ffe have Fhilo's 
mysticism. Aooording to his doctrine, the goal of the 
righteous man is to arrive at this vision of God, and, having 
done that, to enjoy · the oommunion· with the Divine. Thus, 
Philo based his belief in the existence of God on the apparent 
orderly arrange~ent in the universe, upon the evidences of 
causality in the oosmos, and upon spiritual intuitions. These 
three, says Philo, prove that God exists and that He is 
independent of everything else. 
However, of more importance is Philo's teaching concerning 
the nature of God. That God exists is an unquestioned fact. 
But matters are not so simple when it comes to learning who 
God is, for here there is room tor much speculation. Now, if 
any certain conclusion oan be drawn from Philo's system, it 
is this that God is a transcendent God. He is entirely 
separate from man and the world, incapable of coming into 
contact with anything finite. In this respect, he agrees with 
Old Testament theology, which speaks of God's wisdom tran-
scending the worldi and of man's inability to behold God.8 
6p er. On the Migration of Abraham. 
7. Isaiah 55, 9. 
a. Exodus 33, 20. 
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In keeping with this lofty conception, Philo regards 
God as transcending all description. Simply because He 1s 
so elevated above the world, and because we thus are µnable 
to know Him, nothing positive can be said ot Him. That which 
is begotten cannot comprehend that which is unbegotten. Thus, 
appealing to Exodus 3, 14 (LXX), Philo calls God ro ov. God's 
nature is inexpressible by any name, for, Philo points out, 
God refers to Himself as "I am that I am.".f Hence, we know 
only that He is and not what He is. We know him only negatively 
and not positively, because all those names by which we, in 
human speech, are accustomed to call Rim are only predicates 
which contrast his infinite Being with the finite character-
istics of the world. While God's creatures are definitely 
related to Him~ He is in no way related to them. He alone is 
self-sufficient, transcendent, changeless, eternal, without 
quality. 
The point from which Philo proceeds is the antithesis 
of God and the world, the Infinite and the finite • . For this 
reason Philo makes an effort to explain away the anthropo-
morphic and anthropopathic statements concerning God in the 
Old Testament. He regarded it as impious to speak of God as 
having any of the characteristics of a created being. According 
to Philo, such terms are used only for the accommodation of 
those who are unable to understand. Not everyone has the same 
gift of thought and the ability to interpret. Thus, ror our 
benefit, Scripture has pictured God in such terms so that we 
9. · Exodus 3, 14. 
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may kn.ow of his existence •. Furthermore, human language itself 
is inadequate to express the true conception of God. To these 
ideas Philo gives expression in the following passage: 
"God being uncreated and the Author of the creation 
of the others needs none of the properties which 
belong to the creatures which He has brought into 
being. For consider, if He uses our bodily parts 
or organs He has feet to move from one place to 
another. But whither will He go or walk since His 
presence fills everything? To whom ~11 He go, 
when none is H1s equal? And for what purpose will 
He walk? .For it cannot be out of care for health 
as it is with us. Hands H..e must have to receive 
and give. Yet He receives nothing from anyone, for, 
besides that He has no needs, all things are His 
possessions, e.nd when He gives, He employs as · 
minister ot His gifts the Reason wherewith also He 
made the worid. Nor did He need eyes, which have 
no power of perception without the light which meets 
our sense·. But that light is created, whereas God 
saw before creation, being Himself His own light. 
Why need we speak of the organs . of nourishment? If 
He has them, He eats and is filled, rests awhile and 
after the rest has need again, and the accompaniments 
of this I Will not dwell upon. These are the mythical 
fictions of the impious, who, professing to represent 
the deity as of human form, in reality represent Him 
as having human passions. 
"Why then does Moses speak of feet and hands, goings 
in and goings out in connexion with the Uncreated, or 
o~ His arming to defend Himself against His enemies? 
For he describes Him as bearing a sword, and using as 
His weapons minds and death-dealing fire (thunderbolt 
and storm blast the poets call them, using different 
words, and say they are the weapons· of the Cause). Why 
again does he speak of His jealousy, His wrath, His 
moods of anger, and the other emotions similar to them, 
whioh he describes in te~ms of human nature? But to 
those who ask. .these questions Moses answers thus: 
'Sirs, the lawgiver who aims at the best must have one 
end only before him - to benefit all whom his work 
reaches. Those to whose lot has fallen a generously 
gifted nature and a training blameless throughout, and 
who thus find that their later course through life 
lies in a straight and even highway, have truth for 
their fellow-traveller, and being admitted by her into 
the 1nt'allible mysteries of the Existent do not over-
lay the conception of God with any of the attributes 
of created being. These find a moral most pertinent 
in the oracles of revelation, that 'God is not as a 
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man' nor yet is He as the heaven or as the universe. 
These last are forms of a particular kind which 
present themselves to our senses. But He is not 
apprehensible even by the mind, save in the fact 
that He is. For it is His existence which we 
apprehend, and of what lies outside that existence 
nothing. But they whose m tural wit is more dense 
and dull, or whose early training has been mis-
handled, since they have no. power of clear vision, 
need physicians in .the shape of admonishers, who 
will devise the treatment proper to their present 
condition. Thus ill-disciplined and foolish slaves 
receive profit f'ro.m a master who ·frightens them, tor 
they fear his threats and menaces and thus involun-
tarily are schooled by fear. All such may well 
learn the unt1Uth, which will benefit them, if they 
cannot be brought to wisdom by truth."/O 
It is clear that Philo regarded God as incapable of being 
comprehended. The best we can do is to think of Him as being, 
entirely free from all quality or limitations, or as Philo puts 
it: 
"Nothing that can give assurance can give positive 
assurance touching God, for to none has He shown His 
nature, but He bas rendered it invisible to our 
whole race. Who oan assert of the First Cause either 
that It is without body or that It is a body, that rt 
is of such a kind or that It is of no kind? In a 
word who can make any positive assertion concerning 
His essence or quality or state or movement?"ll 
Yet Philo did not rob God of personality. On the contrary, 
he regarded God as a personal God, the divine, self-determining 
Mind. This he asserts in the words: 
· "Moses, both because he had attained the very summit 
of philosophy, and because he had been divinely 
instructed 1n the greater and most es~ential }'.8rt of 
Nature's lore, could not fail to recognize that the 
universal must consist of two parts, one part active 
cause and the other passive object; and that the 
10. On the Unohangeableness of God, 56-64. 
11. Allegorical Interpretation, III, 206. 
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active Cause is the perfectly pure and unsullied 
Mind of the universe, transcending virtue, tran-
scending knowledge, transcending the good itself 
and the beautiful itself; while the passive part 
is in itself incapable of life. and motion, but, 
when set in motion and shaped and quickened by 
Mind, changes into the most perfect masterpiece, 
namely this world."'~ 
As the rational Cause, God is in distinct antithesis to 
creation. Moreover, He exercises a continual causa~ity, 
forever holding the world together and preventing it from 
disintegrating and vanishing. But our best efforts in searching 
for God will be rewarded only in being able "to .comprehend that 
God in his essential being is absolutely incomprehensible, and 
to see that He is not to be seen".'3 
One of these negative predicates by which God is described 
is His namelessness. Since the essence of the Divine Being is 
unknown, therefore, God is without a name, at least as far as 
we human beings are concerned. To prove this doctrine, Philo 
appeals to the incident in Scripture where God appeared to 
Moses 1n the burning bush and called Himself, "I am that I am". 
This suggests to Philo that God is without a proper name, and 
is referred to merely as being. No name is to be applied to 
Him who is 1nf'inite. Names are characteristic of finite and 
created things only/~ If we do call God by some particular 
name, it is only because our minds are imperfect and we need 
12. On the Creation, 8-9. 
13. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 20. 
14. On the Life of Moses, I, 74-76. 
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some mode or way of referring to him. Yet no single name 
exhausts or describes the essence of God. 
Still on th.e negative side, we notice, in the next place, 
tha.t God is without qualities.'5 ~o description can be applied 
to Him because He transcends all qualities, because "he is 
above them, owing nothing to them, but being himself the _liv1ng 
source f'rom whi,ch they emanate."'' According to Philo, 11' we 
ascribe qualities to God we immediately place him in a class, 
to which others may belong_. This would be entirely unworthy 
of God. Thus, . the best we can do is to reg~rd him as without 
quel1t1es, a -sel~.-existent _Being· whose essenc.e is absolutely 
sui generis. Thia idea Philo expresses in the tollowing 
passage: 
"For not even the whole world would be a place tit 
for God to make His abode, since God is His own 
place, and He is tilled by Himselt, and sutfioient 
for Himself, filling and containing all other things 
in their destitution and barrenness and emptiness, 
but Himself contained by nothing else, seeing that 
He is Himself One and the Whole." 11 
This complete transcendence of God Philo speaks ot in 
another passage, in which he indicates that, though we may 
know of God!s existence, it is impossible to know His essence. 
"Yet the vision [of God, gained by the righteous man] 
only showed that He is, not what He is. For this 
which is better than the good, more venerable than 
the monad, purer than the unit, cannot be d1Soerned 
by anyone else; to God alone is it permitted to 
apprehend God," 'ti 
.,, 
15. o'-TT0l05 
16. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 24. 
17. Allegorical Interpretation, I, 44. 
18. On Rewards and Funishments, 59-40. 
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Thus God is superior to all description, tor everything 
that is good and perfect and blessed is comprehended in God, 
but is only a part ot His full essence. 
Now with such a lofty conception of God it might be 
expected that P~ilo would stop at this point and be content 
with the incomprehensibility of God. On the contrary, he is 
not satisfied wi.th purely negative conceptions, but freely 
ascribes positive d.esori.ptions to the self-existent Being. 
In this appa.rent contradiction critics of Philo have revelled. 
They have pointed out that this is an instence of glaring 
inconsistency, for, on the one hand, Philo denies all attributes 
to God, and, o·n the other, he ascribes attributes · to Him. The 
difficulty, no doubt, arose from Philo's attempt to solve 
rationally the problems of transcendence and immanence. Philo 
has no doubt about the transcendence of .God, and he was equally 
convinced that God acts upon the world. The latter implies 
positive properties. For Philo or, for that matter, for anyone 
who tries with human reason to find a solution to a problem 
containing two such irreconcilable elements, the difficulty is 
obvious. Philo*s whole Logos doctrine is an attempt to 
reconcile these opposites, an attempt to link the infinite with 
the finite. Thus, to explain the jmmanence of God, it was 
necessary to presuppose positive properties. We use the word 
''properties" advisedly, for Philo makes the distinction between 
qualities and properties. While Ood can be regarded as having 
only negative qualities, He does have positive properties.19 It 
19. Cf. Allegorical Interpretation, II, 79ft. 
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there is any essential difference between the two outside 
. . 
the sphere of philosophy, we ere not aware or it. But Philo 
was, after all, a philosopher, and .we will have to try to 
observe his distinction. 
Accordingly, then, Phiio ascribes eternity to God. Since 
God is the oaus·e and the mind of the universe, He must be 
eternal, for it He were not eternal, He could not be the 
first oause and the source of all things. This eternity ot 
God is expressed in the following passage: 
"Who then is he that sows in them the good seed 
save the Father of all, that is God unbegotten 
and begotten of all things." ~0 
All other tbings have come into being by creation, but 
God alone is without beginning and the Father of all. In 
this respect He is different from everything else. Further-
more, since creation implies change, God, who 1s uncreated, 
is necessarily unchangeable and, consequently, incorruptible. 
This incorruptibility, together with the unity of God, is 
expressed thus: 
"God is alone, a Unity, in the sense that His nature 
is simple not composite, whereas each one of us and 
of all other created beings is made up of many things. 
I, for example, am many things in one. I am soul and 
body. To soul belong rational and irrational parts, 
and to body, again, different properties, warm and 
cold, heavy and light, . dry and moist. But God is not 
a composite Being, consisting of many parts, nor is 
He mi.Xed with aught else. For whatever is added to 
God, is either superior or inferior or equal to Him. 
But there is nothing equal or superior to God. And 
no lesser thing is resolved into Him. It He do so 
assimilate any lesser thing, He also will be lessened. 
And if He can be made less, He will also be capable 
of corruption; and even to imagine this we.re 
20. On the Cherubim, 44 
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blasphemous. The none" and the "monad" are. therefore, 
the only standard for determining the oategory to 
which God belongs. Rather should we say. the One God 
is the sole standard for the nmonad". For. like time, 
all number 1s subsequent to the universe; end God is 
prior to the universe, and 1s 1 ts UiOker." ~, 
Other attributes or properties upon which we need not 
elaborate, and which we should expect to ~e in.eluded in ?hilo•s 
lofty conception of Goci are His 1nvis1bil1 ty/J. His omnipresence:' 
His transcending space and time;" His omn1sc1encefs- His 
omnipotence;' His complete perteet1on • .t 7 
To one particular attribute, however, some attention must 
be given, namely1 God's goodness. for this brings us to matters 
oonce~ning creation and providence. In connection with God's 
goodness we find .Philo•s answer to the reason tor creation and 
providence. This is expressly stated in his treatise On the 
Cherubim: 
"For to bring anything into being needs all these 
conjo1nt1y, the "by which"• the tttrom which", the 
"through whioh v• , the "for which", and the first 
of these 1s the cause, the second the material, 
the third the tool or instrument, and the fourth 
the end or object. If we ask what combination is 
always needed that a house or city should be built 1 
the ans\',er is a builder, stones or timber, and 
instruments. ¥hat 1s the builder but the cause 
"by w.hich"? What are t he stones and t imber but 
the material "from whiob"? What are the instruments 
but the meons nthrough which"? And what is the end 
or object ot the building but shelter and safety, 
end this oonsti tutes the "tor which•'. Let us leave 
these merely partioular bu1ld1ngs, and contemplate 
~l. AlleP.Or1oal Interpretation, II, 2-3. 
22. on Abraham, 76. 
23. On the Confusion of Tongues, 134•139. 
24 .. ~iho is the Heir of Divine Things, 227-229. 
26. on the Unohangeableness of God, a-9. 
26. On the Creation, 46. 
27. On the Cherubim, 85-86. 
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that greatest of' houses or cities, this universe. 
We shall see that its cause 1s God, by whom it has 
come into being, 1 ts material the tour elements, 
from which it was compounded, its instrument the 
word of' God, through which it was framed, and the 
final cause of the building is the goodness of the 
architect. It is thus that truth-lovers distinguish, 
who desire true and sound knowledge."~' 
God, according to Philo, created the world because He is 
good and kind, and for the same reason He exercises providence 
over the world. Using the analogy of the provisions that 
parents make for their children, Philo describes God as dealing 
bountifully with His creatures!' His blessings are showered 
down upon both the good and the evil. In tact, so numerous 
are the blessings flowing from God's goodness that the world 
cannot contain them. Not only are His punishments intolerable, 
but even His blessings are so abundant th.at not even the whole 
world could hold them, should God wish to manifest all of them. 
For that reason, He says, the Israelites said to Moses, "Speak 
thou w1 th us, and we will hear; but let not God speak w1 th us, 
lest we die."3° His conclusion is that the status of the 
universe is measured in direct proportion to God's bestowing 
or withholding His blessings.3/ 
But if God is so good in exercising divine providence, 
how do we account for the evil in the world? How is it possible 
that evil should even exist in a world that owes its creation 
28. on the Cherubim, 125-127. Here Philo shows his 
acquaintance with Aristotelian causality. 
29. Cf. On the Creation, 171-172. 
50. Exodus 20, 19. 
31. On Dreams, 143-
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and providence to the goodness ot God? Why is there pain, 
pestilence, and calamities of all kinds? Furthermore, why 
is it that these misfortunes appear to be unequally 
distributed, those who deserve them often escaping them and 
the righteous ones often having more than their share? These 
questions are answered in Philo's two treatises On Providence, 
in which he pursues philosophical arguments and does not 
attempt to answer such questions on the basis of Scr~pture 
and exegetical wri ting.32. As to the .cause or evil, Philo is 
convinced that God has nothing to do with it. He uses numerous 
human analogies to show that evil is something which exists 
outside of God and cannot be attributed to Him, for a tran-
scendent, perfect, beneficent God cannot be mentioned 1n the 
same breath with evil. 
And yet by philosophic argument he tries to show that all 
evil is not unnecessary. On the principle that some evil is 
required to insure the harmon1ou~ functioning of the entire 
cosmos, he offers many illustrations in which evil is at once 
a misfortune for some and a blessing for others. Thus, the 
principle of God's goodness is not violated or contradicted, 
but His ways are justified. Incidentally, this very point 
gives us a good insight into Philo's eclectic tendencies. 
Unable to solve the mysteries of God's hidden ways from the 
writings of Judaism, he turns to philosophic speculation~ All 
this is quite consistent with his attempt to harmonize Jewish 
theology and Greek philosophy. 
32. Cf. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 58. 
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This, 1n broad outline, 1s Philo's conception of God. 
Throughout, he has in mind a God who is transcendent above 
everything in the universe. Nothing finite can describe Him 
or apprehend Him. The Infinite i s simply too far above the 
finite. In this respect Philo's conception is Jewish. But 
he was also impressed by the apparent connection between God 
and the world. The universe seemed to hinge on the presence 
of a divine power working in .it. All the phenome~a of nature 
seemed to shout this to him. God must in some way be connected 
with the world. Yet transcendence and immanence are terms 
which defy human reconciliation. Undoubtedly, Philo must have 
realized the difficulty. Accordingly, to supply the rational 
need for an intermediate link, Philo introduced his doctrine 
of the Logos. The. Logos was the instrument through which God 
descended to man and through which man ascended to God. It is 
the fundamental doctrine of Philo's system, not only because 
for him it solved a great difficulty, but also because it 





Doctrine ot the Logos 
The doctrine of the Logos reached 1ts fullest develop-
ment in Philo.. To be sur.e, this endeavor to bridge the chasm 
between God and the world was not original with Philo. As 
long as the world has existed, man has been concerned about 
his relations to God and about God's mode of dealing with 
mankind. This innate feeling of dependence upon the supreme 
Being and a conscious speculation about His activity in the 
world has been a matter of supreme i mportance to every 
thoughtful human being. Nor was the formal doctrine of the 
Logos an original concept with Philo. It is true, no one 
before Philo had discussed it so thoroughly nor had attached 
so much importance to it, but the idea itself, including the 
very name, had already had an historical development before 
Philo appeared on the scene. The roots of this concept had 
been planted centuries before, so that the idea had already 
attained formidable proportions by the time Philo began to 
nourish it. In his hands it developed and matured and reached 
its highest growth. It remained for Christianity to reveal 
the full, supreme significance of the Logos. 
These Logos roots, planted already five centuries before 
Philo's time were embedded in Greek soil. Greek thinkers 
cultivated them and gradually the Logos flower began to emerge. 
Thus, by the time Philo appsared, he took up a concept that 
was not original with him, but whose terminology and 
philosophical form had long been influenced by Greek thought. 
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Philo, however, succeeded in bringing out more of its color 
by shedding a religious light upon it. The Logos of the 
Greeks had been thoroughly pagan. Although by no means 
bringing out the t~ue meaning of the Logos, as John in his 
Gospel has done, Philo re-interpreted this pagan, philosophical . 
Logos of the Greeks by attaching . a religious significance to 
it. Through the ingenuity of Philo, the Greek Logos was 
united with Hebrew monotheism. Again, we are face to face 
with the motivating purpose in Philo's mind. His object was, 
not to introduce a new system, but to effect a union bet~een 
two existing systems -- Greek philosophy and Jewish theology, 
He apparently made _no conscious attempt to be original. On 
the contrary, he was an eclectic. His theology was Jewish, 
his philosophy a mere reproduction of what he considered best 
for his purpose from various existing systems. Thus, to 
appreciate his own concept, it will be instructive to review 
briefly certain phases of Greek philosophy which Philo found 
useful in establishing his Logos doctrine. It will be well 
also to keep in mind that we are now dealing with the 
philosophical Logos. Strictly speaking, there is no evolution 
of the Logos idea as we Christians know and believe it, When 
John speaks of the Logos as the Son or God made incarnate, he 
is speaking of a divine revelation, which is far removed from 
the philosophical Logos idea. And so, when we speak of the 
development or of the primitive traces or a Logos concept, it 
is the development of the philosophical Logos or ot the use 




Heraclitus, the Ephesian, who flourished about 500 B.o., 
was one of the first to introduce a more or less formal Logos 
doctrine. He was, by and large, a pantheist, and we are not 
surprised that the first traces of the Logos assumed the 
nature of a cosmical power. This philosopher's premise is 
that all things are in a state of constant flow and change, 
s ·o that not a single object is the same for two successive 
moments.I By logical deduction he arrived at the conclusion 
that fire must be the primitive substance, because fire is the 
most changeable of all the elements. All things are derived 
from fire. Fire changes into water, and of water half changes 
in to earth, while the other half returns to the original 
substance, fire, Thus, all the elements are in a constant 
sta te of change. 
However, all this change in the universe proceeds according 
to a fixed law, which is none other than cosmical reason or the 
Logos. All things happen according to this Logos. Whether 
Heraclitus ascribed a conscious intelligence to the universe 
is a matter of conjecture. He seems to recognize an immanent 
reason in the world, but we cannpt prove that the Logos of 
Heraclitus had a conscious intelligence.~ Apparently, he 
recognizes only a rational law pervading the universe. 
In another sense, the Logos is really fire spiritualized, 
while the material element is fire itself. Now, of the substance 
1. Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, P• 46 
2. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. I, P• 39. 
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of this Logos, this sp1r1tual1zed fire, the human soul is ·a 
portion.3 The soul is not separated in each 1nd1vj.dual 11f'e, 
but is in a state of change like everything else. Actually 
the soul is material., tor 1t consists of fire, being of the 
same nature as the universal principle. Heraclitus calls 1t 
an "exhalation" of the universal principle, the fire which 
ascends upwards out of the moist elements of the world. Here 
his pantheism is evident. Heraclitus compared the Logos in 
the universe to human reason in the individual. In the former 
1 t was objective., u~conscious reason, in the latter, subjective, 
conscious intelligence. Thus, says Drummond, he avoided the 
terms 
,.. I 
yov5 and tpeYJv because they implied subjectiv.e kno·jlledge, 
while in the Logos, this idea is not necessarily included.~ 
It is also apparent that with Heraclitus the Logos has 
no relation to the "Word". His is a materialistic Logos, a 
cosmical power, so that there is no transcendent God whose 
word it could be. It is the universal reason in opposition to 
the individual thought, "the rational self-evolution or the 
world."s The relation is rather that of the whole to the parts, 
since the parts are manifestations of the whole (the Logos). 
This, then, is one of the earliest and one of the more 
prominent usages of the Logos concept. In his speculations, 
Heraclitus arrived at a cosmical power in the universe 
analagous to human reason in the individual and this rational 
3. Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, P• 47 
4. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. I., P• 47. 
5. Ibid, P• 46. 
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law he termed Logos. Thus, Heraclitus is credited with 
giving the first important impulse to this concept, which 
was gradually to be taken up and developed further by those 
who succeeded him. 
The first to make an advance in this newly found Logos 
concept was Anaxagoras, who was born about 500 B.C. He also 
claimed a primitive substance e~isted, but unlike his 
predecessors, he said it was unlimited in quality and number. 
To show how this unlimited primitive substance· got into motion 
and order, Anaxagoras formed his doctrine of the "mind". He 
. . . .. 
uses the word' '- ~OVf(mind) instead of >i.4{05 (reason).' "Mind" 
was separated from ·a11 other substance and ruled over all 
things, yet it is not clear whether it is immaterial or material. 
Since it brought everything into orderly arrangement, it also 
possessed univers~l knowledge. However, Anaxagoras never 
attributed personal existence to mind. It was in some things 
but not in all things; it is a substance present in larger or 
smaller quantities in various objects. 
Anaxagoras' principal object was to explain the Jl!lterial 
world, and the idea of "mind" was introduced rather as a con-
venience. He was ooncerned chiefly with material phenomena, 
and his only purpose in using the doctrine or mind ( vov5) was 
to explain the original motion of the primitive substance, 
which then spread in wider circles. This gave rise to a force 
which, under mechanical laws, separated the universe into ether 
and air. By collection or separation these formed the water, 
6. Ibid, P• 48. 
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earth, stones, and, finally, the sun and stars. Since mind 
is divisible and exists in smaller or larger proportions 1n 
various objects, it also exists in all living things. It is 
virtually identified with the soul or the vital principle. 
This pantheism reaches its extreme when Anaxagoras says that 
even the plants have their share of mind. Evidently, the 
human soul was a par·t of, and of the same substance as, the 
universal mind. Whether it retained its individual being 
when separated from the body• or was reabsorbed in the 
cosmical mind, is not determined. 
Thus, by the .introduction of the term "mind", the Logos 
doctrine was advanced to a certain degree. Under Anaxagoras 
it still had all the characteristics of a vague, cosmical 
f'oroe in the universe, yet by ascribing universal knowledge 
to "mind", a distinct advance was made from the Logos of 
Heraclitus, which did not have this attribute, but was rather 
a mere rational law. 
At this point we might mention in passing the name ot 
Socrates. His system contains no doctrine of the Logos, but 
it does contain some things that are related to it. Having 
conceived of teleology, or design and purpose in the universe, 
Socrates dwells on the personal relations between the divine 
and the human. He believed in the personality of one supreme 
and universal God, under whom there were also a number of 
interior and looal subordinate deities, but he also believed 
that tbe universal mind could become divisible and could 
separate into individual human souls, all the while retaining 
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all the qualities of mind. Thus, the human soul partakes 
of the divine substance and is capable or knowing God or the 
gods. This was Socrates' chief . mode of approach to the divine. 
As tar as the Logos doctrine is concerned, S.o~rates added 
nothing new .. yet his attempt to bring the human and the divine 
into relation with each other has some signiticanoe, tor it 
showed that Greek philosophy was beginning to consider spiritual 
things in addition to material phenomena. 
The next Greek philosopher with whom we have to do deserves 
more than passing interest in this present discussion. We refer 
to Plato. His philosophy actually contains ·no doctrine of the 
Logos, yet some ot his doctrines have contributed to the 
Alexandrian conception of the Logos. 
The basis of the Platonic system is the doctrine of "ideas",7 
and a knowledge of this doctrine is .essential to the under-
standing of Philo. According to Plato, "ideas" are eternal, 
unchangeable realities, constituting the world of real existence, 
apprehended only by the reason ( vov5 } • In the world of senses · 
there 1s no real being, only shifting phenomena. Real knowledge 
can be found only by arriving at general notions, which are 
reality. Thus, each visible object is merely an imperfect 
pattern of the gene~al idea. The ideas are not subject to space. 
Yet they are neither divine thoughts, but real substances. Plato 
believed that these ideas existed in indefinite multitude, 
because there is an idea corresponding to every general notion 
that we are capable of forming. He also speaks of a hierarchy 
?. ct. Zeller, outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, 
PP• 129ft. 
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Of ideas, of which the highest is that of good ( i ~ov ;,r~Bov 
~(I 8 
to~~ ). The latter he sometimes identifies with God, so 
that "the good" is "the creator and Father of the universe." 
In the relation of the eternal to the phenomenal, Plato 
approaches most nearly to the doctrine ot the· Logos. The 
basis for the creation or the cosmos is the goodness of the 
creator, who wished everything else to be good. 9 Now, since 
nothing is good without mind, and since mind cannot be 
separated from soul, the ·oreator placed mind in the soul and 
soul in the body. This is his doctrine of the cosmical soul. 
The cosmos was due to the forethought of God, and apparently 
was also a living being endowed with soul and mind. Since the 
universe was a living being, penetrated in all its parts with 
a rational soul, this soul was the mediating term between the 
ideal and the material, the eternal and the phenomenal. Like 
the ideas, it was incorporeal, like material. objects it had 
come into being. It existed in space and was capeble of motion. 
The cosmical soul was the regulating and harmonizing principle 
in the world. Again, we have the relation between the microcosm 
and the macrocosm, for according to Plato, just as our bodies 
were fashioned after the great body of the universe, so the 
individual soul proceeded from the world's more perfect soul. 
The souls were of the same material as the soul of the universe, 
only with diminished purity. Divine in origin and nature, pre-
existent and immortal, the soul formed the link between the 
a. Drwnmond, op. oit., Vol. I, P• 59. 
9. Note the resemblance between Philo and Plato on this 
point (ot. p. 33). 
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ideal and the phenomenal worlds. 
This gives us a sketchy background for Plato's tore-
shadoWing the ~ogoa doctrine. Using the term "mind", he 
recognized the pr~sence or an all-pervading reason in the 
universe. Moreover·, in order to bridge the chasm between 
God and the world, he introduced his theory of the cosmical 
soul. This universal soul, different trom, · yet related to, 
the supreme God, was the connecting link between the eternal 
and the phenomenal world, and it is very similar to the later 
Alexandrian philosophy of the Logos. Like the philosophical 
Logos, the soul is present everywhere in IBture, yet with 
Plato "the soul is far more exclusively connected with the 
material universe than is the Logos of Philo." 10 It will later 
become apparent that Plato and Philo agree in many things. 
Philo was indebted to Plato in a great measure both as to 
thought and terminology. Had Philo been a Greek and not a 
Jew, he might have been Plato's successor. 
Yet of all the schools of Greek thought, the Stoics mast 
fully developed a doctrine ot the Logos. They were not so 
much interested in speculation about the mysteries ot nature, 
but were more concerned with practical, religious questions. 
The most eminent Stoic, perhaps, was Chrysippus, but only 
fragments of his writings remain, so that we are indebted to 
the later Stoic writers for our knowledge of this system. 
The fundamentals ot Stoic thought are materialism and 
pantheism. Their celebrated teaching that man should live in 
10. ·Drummond, op. cit., Vol. I, P• 68. 
..... 
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conformity with nature is well known. Yet their doctrine ot 
the -Logos is significant for its contribution to Alexandrian 
theology. The Stoics by various ph1losophioal arguments 
concluded that there was reason or wisdom in the universe. 
All the orderly movements and the unchangeable constancy in 
the universe proved a controlling reason. Indeed, the universe· 
itself, they believed, produces this, .and, hence, they 
identified the universe with God. For the Stoics such terms 
as the universe, divine reason, supreme oaus·e or Logos were 
all synonymous. Divine reason or the Logos is not detached 
from, but is the .. universe its elf. Their materialism becomes 
apparent when they thus leave no further room for a higher 
power transcending the material world. With them the ultimate 
is material causality, and the obvious conclusion is that God 
is a material substance and the Logos a corporeal spirit." 
Following Heraclitus, they attach great importance to fire. 
God or Iliture was fire, and all other elements resulted by 
chemical change from fire. Thus, we arrive at a sort of 
tire-Logos, a mixture of physical and religious speculation. 
But the stoics seem to devia te somewhat from this principle 
when they speak of God also as a spirit. Air or breath was 
coordinate with fire, and both had pervading tendencies. Air 
is said to permeate all things. Since these terms were 
applied to God or the Logos who pervaded and permeated matter, 
including "ditches and worms and workers of 1ntamy" :.2. we are 
11. Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, p.215 
12. Quoted in Drummond, op. oit., Vol. I, P• 87 . 
. 
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confronted with an all-pervading Logos, which controls the 
administration of the universe. Accordins to its various 
functions in the .economy or the world, it is variously called 
Destiny, Truth, Fat.e, Cause, Nature, Providence, Universe, 
Necessity, eto • . There is nothing better than the universe, 
hence, it had reason and was God. In another respect God is 
nature, since, the Stoics believed, creation and providence 
are due to nature. Furthermore, since everything is supposed 
to happen according to destiny or natural causation, God is 
spoken of as destiny. And so on. The result is that "at every 
turn we are brought back to the all-penetrating Logos" •13 Being 
extreme moralists, the Stoics also found the cause for both 
good and evil to reaide in nature or the universe or the Logos, 
etc. 
But there is another aspect of the Stoical Logos besides 
1 ·ts all-pervading, materialistic and pantheistic aspect, and 
... ... 
I I 
that is the doctrine of the ''seminal Logos" (Ao005 <rTTl€p."-'CLl<o5). 
It is really a theory of evolution. The universe is regarded 
as an organism which unfolded from a seed, in which all earthly 
and heavenly things were wrapped up and were produced at 
determined times. Th.is does not contradict the other explanation 
of causality, for the primeval .fire was regarded es the seed. 
Since the tire is both reason (as explained above) and seed1 we 
have the combined expression -- seminal reason. This seminal 
Logos is God Himself, the organic principle of the universe. At 
this point we are introduced to the logoi, a term and a concept 
13. Drummond, op • . cit., Vol. I, p. 94. 
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which Philo adopts literally. Just as the universe evolved 
from the seminal Logos, so the various organic bodies within 
the cosmos also had their seminal logo1, which were included 
within the Logos or the universe, and as a totality either 
proceeded from, o-r · merged into, the universal Logos. Thus, 
the pristine tire, like a seed, contained the logoi and causes 
of all things; ·pa~t, present, and future, the latter being 
united in the universal Logos. In to this ·seminal Logos return 
the souls or the dead. 
As far as the relation of the Logos to the human soul is 
concerned, the Stoics taught that man is a portion of the 
universal reason, which, having become detached from itself, 
constitutes man's personality. In other words, the soul, mind, 
or reason was God, dwelling as a guest within the human body.'~ 
Thus, both God and man participated 1n the Logos. Without 
pausing to follow their reasoning, we shall proceed to the 
division of the soul in man, and notice that the Stoics separated 
the soul into eight parts the rational or intellectual 
faculty, the faculties of speech and reproduction, and the five 
senses. or these, speech appeared to be in closest connection 
with the rational faculty, sinoe the voice converts the thoughts 
of the soul into sound. Thus, the so-called two-fold Logos in 
man originated -- th$ internal Logos I ~ f (AO/o> ~vo,v.8er:o; ) and the 
I I 
uttered Logos ( >.. o0o J · Tr&oyoe 1.1<0 5 ) • The latter is the 
correlative of the internal Logos/!" 
14. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. I, P• 108. 
15. Ibid, Vol. I, P• 110 .• 
• 48 • 
These are the more obvious oontributions of' the Stoical 
Logos to Alexandrian theology. It was a Logqs· that manifested 
itself under various aspeots, many of them ·contradiotory and 
unreal, all purely philosophical and materialistic. Indeed,' 
the whole development of the Logos concept in the hands of' 
Greek philosophy is pagan. Their problem was to bring the 
human into relation with the divine, a problem which human 
speculation can never solve. Since, therefore, their approach 
to the problem was materialistic, a materialistic and unsatis-
factory solution was inevitable. Only divine revelation could 
solve the mystery. This was f~;iisrm.ess to the Greeks. 
In developing his Logos doctrine, Philo was influenced 
large:!..y }Jy this a.reek speculation. This is not surprising, if 
we keep in mind his purpose of harmonizing Jewish and Greek 
thought. But Phtlo also was influenced by Judaism. He was an 
orthodox Jew, and had all the ba~kground of the Old Testament. 
Thus, the Old Testament, too, contributed to the 
formulation of the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy of which 
Philo was the most distinguished exponent. In the Old Testament 
we find certain root~ of the Logos concept. There are various 
terms and concepts in the Old Testament which anticipate the 
Logos of later times. The Jews of Old Testament times were 
' 
characterized by their strict monotheism. Jehovah was the only 
true God. Most important of all, he was transcendent. Yet 
equally fundamental was the Old Testament truth that God speaks 
to the human soul and projects Himself' into the affairs of' 
nature and men. In Alexandrian philosophy we are aware of a 
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philosophical explanation ot these two opposing thoughts~-
God's transcendence and His immanence. Jew1sh philosophers 
attempted to reconcile the two by introducing mediating 
powers. But in the Old Testament the Jewish religionist 
rested on his fait·h in Jehovah and sought not so much a 
theory of God's relations to nature, but tried to explain 
the manner in which God takes ·part in the affairs ot men. 
These descriptions contributed to the later doctrine of the 
Logos in Philo, tor, as we have already remarked, Philo 
approached his task with pre-conceived notions, which were 
the re~ult of his Jewish faith. 
In viewing the concepts under which God is represented 
as active in the world we must keep in mind that there is in 
the Old Testament much poetical personification. Wisdom, for 
instance, is one of the terms used to denote God's active 
agency in the world, as is also the "Word".'' The latter term 
contributed much to later Alexandrian theology. The LXX 
' translation uses the word A 0/DJ. Apparently the ideas of 
Spirit, Breath and Word are closely related, and it may be 
that the Jew conceived of the latter as "the articulate shape 
or expression of the :tormer".17 They are not God Himself, but 
powers which He sends forth. With Him, to speak is to create.18 
Here we have a theory of God's relation to the universe and 
of the manner in which He communicates with it, although it 
l6. ct. Isaiah 2,1; Ps. 33,6; 147,18; 148,8; c:r. also 
Genesis 1 1 "And God said." 
17. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. I, P• 137. 
18. Ct. Ps. 33, 9. 
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cannot be shown that the idea of mediation is implied. 
But the "Word of the Lord" was not only an agency 
employed in creation. It also became a name tor the 
revelation of Jehovah in the hearts of men:9 Numerous 
passages show that · the "Word" was regarded 1n this sense • ..;1.0 
Now, while it is significant that the finite and the 
infinite are united with each other by 100ana of the "Word", 
tl1e latter expression is probably related to Alexandrian 
theology more closely in language than tn thought. We 
cannot prove from the passages cited that the "Word" 1s a 
distinct hypostasis, and in this respect it differs from 
the later idea of the Logos. 
Yet when ue introduce the concept of Wisdom into the 
discussion, a new light is cast. The " Word" suggests, 
primarily, the power or God in creation and in providence. 
But we take a step farther, when we notice that g>odness, 
intelligence, mercy and understanding are other aspects of 
His relations with men. All these qualities meet in the 
attribute of Wisdom!' According to Jenish interpretation, 
Wisdom appears to become "an agent of God in the accomplish-
ment of His gracious wi 11 and purpose. tt.?~ In the book of 
Proverbs, Wisdom 1~ personified, and some of the leading 
19. George Stevens, The Theology of the New Testament, p.577 
20. er. I Sam. 3,21; Is. 2,1; Ezek. 3,16; 6,1; Jer. 1,2; etc. 
In all these passages the LXX has 
21. Cf. Ps. 147;5; 145,9; 104,24. 
22. Stevens, op. cit., P• 577. 
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ideas of the doctrine of the Logos are apparent:13 On the 
one hand, Wisdom denotes all that is good in God, on the 
other, Wisdom may be apprehended by men. In the book of 
Job, too, Wisdom, while not pers~n1f1ed, is described as 
a distinct entity that is apprehended by men.-~ 
In general, however, these expressions are poetical 
personifications which describe God's activities of power 
and grace in the world. They do not indicate that the 
writers looked ~pon Wisdom as a distinct being paasessing 
divine attributes. The absence of personification in Job 
seems to prove this. Yet here was an important truth in 
Jewish faith, for Wisdom was the principle of unity in God 
and man. This apparently satisfied the Jewish soul. 
However, not only did the Old Testament provide elements 
useful in formulating the later doctrine of the Logos. The 
Old Testament apocryphal and pseudepigraphical writings also 
made definite contributions along the same lines. Traces ot 
Ph1lo's Logos can be found in these extra-canonical writings. 
In the Wisdom of Solomon, for example, we have the origin and 
nature of wisdom desor1bedff Wisdom is God's assistant, sent 
out to do His bidding, She shares in the divine counsels 
because of her intimate association with God • ..:l'° In other words, 
Wisdom is an "instrumental agency". This, we shall see later, 
23. er. Proverbs 3,13-26; 4,5-13; 7,4; 8,1-9,12. 
24. Cf. Job 28, 12ff. 
25. er. ch. 1,10; 7,22-24; 7,25-29. 
26. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. I, P• 220. 
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is in perfect ~greement with Philo's view that Wisdom, 
or the Logos, is an emanation of the divine essence, and 
plays a great part in directing the affairs of man. Whether 
it is only an attribute of God or is an independent being 
is not always clear. At any rate, this prepared the way 
tor Philo's Logos. With Philo, the Logos is not that which 
is spoken (he avoids the term "uttered Logos"), but it is 
consistently an expressi9n of reason, so that the conceptions 
associated with Wisdom are characteristic of the Logos, and 
the two are virtually identified. In Eoclesiastious, too, 
we find Wisdom more or less personified. It is, for example, 
spoken of' as "the first creation of God." J-7 
In the Targums a similar signifioation is found in the 
use of the term "Memra". The reference is to the creative 
power evident in God's speaking ( Gen •. 1). It cannot be 
determined what the precise signification of M.emra is. Some 
regard it as representing "the inmost union of purpose and 
will, and [as providing] a mode in which God could communicate 
Himself to His people, and at the same time sustain the 
universe" f' while others look upon it as "a kind of inte~ 
mediate agent between the transcendent Deity and the world."~' 
Especially the anthropomorphic acts of God were as:ribed to 
the Memra, through whom Jehovah expresses Himself' and executes 
His will. 
27. Cf. Oh. 1,4.10; 24,3-12; 24,32-33. 
28. Joseph Carpenter, The Johannine Writings, p. 292. 
29. Stevens, op. cit., P• 579. 
I 
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This, then, is how the Logos doctrine developed within 
Judaism. It was the Jewish solution to the problem ot God's 
activity in the world. Mediating powers were ascribed to 
the Word and to ~1sdom, and their activity was the Jewish 
answer to the problem of how an infinite, transcendent God 
could be active in the finite world. 
It is obvious that the conception of mediating powers 
had taken a strong hold on the minds of men in one torm or 
another centuries before ·Philo addressed himself to the 
problem. The Greeks, with a view to explaining the relation 
of the Supreme Being, particularly, to nature, had arrived 
a t a metaphysical principle, which, because ot its own orderly 
activity and an apparent predetermined purpose motivating that 
activity, and, further, because reason and intelligence were 
I 1 ts chief attributes, was ref'erred to as the J\a0o;. Judaism, 
on the other hand, approaching the problem from a spiritual 
angle, by which it sought on the basis of faith to explain the 
communion ·between God and man, found the answer in Wisdom or 
in the word of God, the uttered Logos. In philo these two 
streams of thought merge. Religion and philosophy are combined, 
as much as a combination is possible, and a harmony ot the two 
is attempted, which, however, is as unreal as it was sincere. 
All these preliminary speculations and interpretations on 
the part of Greeks and Jews establish the fact that the Logos 
concept occupied. much of the· thought of m.an~ind already betore 
Philo, 80 that th1S Jewish philosopher was by no means original 
in this respect, ~et he deserves a place in the history ot 
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philosophy and rel1_g1ous thought, because, by combining 
two systems, he gave a new interpretation to the Logos 
doctrine. In Philo we find the culmination of that 
combination or Judaism and Hellenism. He brought the 
Logos doctrine to its highest development, that is, before 
Christianity revealed its true significance and obviated 
any further speculation. , 
Perhaps, the most direct approach to Ph1lo's doctrine 
of the Logos would be to consider his theory of the divine 
powers, or logoi, which form a large part or Philo's system. 
Immediately we are confronted by many difficulties. Philo 
himself admit~ that hwnan language about God is inadequate, 
and that figurative language must be employed.3° Fur therm.ore, 
Philo's style of writing is rhetorical, and this often 
obscures his meaning. Jldd to this his allego.rical inter-
pretation, and we see how extremely difficult it becomes to 
fathom his meaning or to establish definitely his position. 
Or, we may see the difficulty by again referring to Philo's 
task. The attempt to harmonize two opposing systems of 
thought -- the teachings of Moses and the speculations of 
Greek metaphysics - necessarily led to many confusions or 
language. 
Philo's theory of creation manifests a dualism or God 
and the world!' Since, according to Philo, God formed the 
world out of pre-existing, shapeless matter, matter must be 
30. See P• 16. 
31. er. his trea tise On the Creation 
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a second principle alongside ot; although infinitely 
inferior to, God. Now, ~n order to· explain the activity 
of God upon matter, Philo ·was led by sheer necessity to 
introduce his doctrine of the 'divine powers' (Jvv~~(J). 
The d1fficul t .y into which he was placed, .aa a result, will 
be seen presently. 
From the contemplation ofnature itself the human soul 
begins to inquire into the nature of cosmical forces, and 
soon perceives that there is some divine power or force 
regulating the wbrld!i God is the Creator of the universe, 
and these forces belonging to Him bring Him into immediate 
connection with the world. They are "unifying_ powers", 33 
because they bind and hold together all the parts of the 
universe, and prevent the universe from being dissolved into 
its parts. Both in the spheres or mind and of matter we are 
confronted by these powers, which give form and reality to 
the objects of nature. All these powers are efficient through 
God, who 1s the ultimate causality. Whenever we see two or 
more objects that can be distinguished, we are aware of the 
presence of powers, for it is the function of these powers to 
differentiate between the objects in the universe. ·In his own 
words we are told: 
"Again the torches of fire borne as in the mys t1o 
torch-rite are the judgments of God the torch-
bearer, judgments bright and radiant, whose wont it 
is to range between the half-pieces, that is between 
the opposites of which the whole world is composed. 
For we read 'torches ot fire which passed through 
32. Cf. P• 23. 
33. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 69. 
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between the half'~pieoes •3"' Thus you may know how 
highly,exoellent is the work or the Potencies 
[6'11v"Y"c!wvJ of God as they pass through the midst 
or material and immaterial things. They destroy 
nothing - for the halt-p1eces remain unharmed -
but divide and distinguish the natur~ of eaoh." 3~ 
Everything that· we see in nat~re had an immaterial or 
ideal pattern, so that these powers or forces themselves are 
immaterial ( Q. <r ~,µ.Cl( , ct). J<o 
Moreover, these divine powers are said to be eternal, 
because they are connected with the eternal mind of God. 
Through their energy the ideal world was formed into the 
material, the intelligtble into the perceptible. The former 
is the archetype of the latter. The world or ideas, then, 
are the powers themselves. Through them God became a.ctive 1n 
the universe. 
The question now arises, Is there not some orderly 
arrangement to these innumerable powers? It is to be expected 
that some would take precedence over others, or that some 
would be dependent upon others. From a passage, in which 
Philo gives an allegorical interpretation of the cherubim 
placed at the gates of Paradise, we gain a clearer view of 
these powers. 
"The voice told me that while God is indeed one, His 
highest and chiefest powers are two, even goodness 
and sovereignty. Through His goodness He begat all 
that is, through His sovereignty He rules what He 
has begotten. And in the midst between the two 
there is a third which unites them, Reason, for it 
34. Cf. Gen. 15, 17. 
35. Who is the· Heir of Divine Things, 311-312. 
36. ct- On the Life of Moses, II, 74. 
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is through reason that God is .both ruler and good. 
Of these two potencies sovereignty and goodness 
the Cherubim are symbols, as the fiery sword 1s 
the ~ymbol of reason. For exceeding swift and 
b~rning heat is reason and chiefly so the reason 
of the ( Great) Cause, tor it alone prece·ded and 
outran all things, conceived before them all, 
manifest above them all." J7 
The two main powers - goodness and sovereignty - unite 
all the other powers, end these two in turn are united by the 
Logos. Using terms which are common in the LXX, Philo 
I . I 
represents goodness as fJio; and sovereignty as xve,o>. From 
these passages it is evident that Philo conceived of the 
goodness and the sovereignty of God as powers which were 
. . 
highest in the hierarchy, under which the whole multitude of 
other powers can be classed. This would appear to be a neatly 
worked out system, if, as we have seen, the powers exercised 
their function according to a hierarchy, each in its own sphere. 
But such is not the case. These powers do not merely stand 
beside each other, but they also appear in each other. One 
partakes of some of the attributes of another. This obsoures 
Philo's orderly arrangement of the powers, assuming that an 
orderly arrangement was intended at all. 
As to the preeise relation of these pONere to God, no one 
seems to know just what Philo believed. He himself was aware 
of the difficulty and, therefore, reoommended that this 
particular study be attempted by those only who were sufficiently 
trained. It has been observed, however, that Philo is here 
involved in a dilemma. Two influenoes cross - the religious 
37. On the Cherubim, 27-28. 
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personal beings and the philosophical impersonal. Philo 
himself is not clear.31 At times, the powers appear to be 
attributes of God and, collectively, represent the nature 
or essence of God.~, But this would not solve Philo' s problem, 
for it does not answer the question how the infinite God, 
trans.cending time and space, nevertheless acts upon the 
world. Certainly, Philo bel~eved that He did. The passage 
which interpreters of Philo use most frequently to prove that 
he conceived of the powers as persona essentially different 
from God is cited by Drummond, who quotes Philo as saying, 
"[out of matter] God generated all things, not 
touching it himself, for it was not right tor the 
,'Jise and Blessed to come in contact with indeter-
minate and mixed matter; but he used the incorporeal 
powers, whose real name is ideas, that the fitting 
form might take possession of each genus."~0 
The idea appears to be that the powers surround God and 
wait upon Him in much the same manner as servants wait to do 
the king's bidding. In other instances, too, Philo creates 
the impression that God is above the powers, and, hence, they 
must in some measure be subordinate entities. There seems to 
be a definite dis tine tion between "God in His essential being 
and God conceived under the partial aspect ot the powers."~' 
The mediating aspect of these powers is introduced when 
Philo speaks of God as touching all things through His powers. 
The connection between the divine and the human is effected 
38. er. Zeller, Die PhilOSO:Qhie der Grieohen, PP• 6llf'f. 
39. ct, On Dreamst I, 232. 
40. Op. cit., Vol. II, P• 113. 
41. Ibid, Vol. II, P• 121. 
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through these mediating powers. God cannot touch the soul 
directly because He is transcendent, but He does this through 
the powers. In the human mind these powers· would appear as 
thoughts, in ma~ter as ideal forms. Inasmuch as they are 
divine and yet d9 not constitute the essence of God, the 
powers form the intermediate link between God and the world. 
"They are the connection between the universe and God 1 
mediating between them, not because they are different from 
both, but because they are strictly separable from neither. 
Withdraw them from the mind, and it becomes a non-entity; 
withdraw them f~om the material world, and it ceases to be a 
cosmos; detach .them, if that be conceivable, from God, and 
they Will sinlc into nothingness.""" And so, Philo refers to 
God under two aspects, God in His unknown and transcendent 
essence, and G9d as He is manifested through His powers. 
In Philo's doctrine of the divine powers most writers 
agree that he is inconsistent and even contradictoJ;"y, and 11" 
we would place opposite passages side by side, we too would 
perhaps agree. But Drummond, who appears to be Ph1lo's most 
sympathetic interpreter, is not so ready to charge him with 
naive contradiction. In trying to find a reason tor the 
apparent inconsistencies, he calls attention to Philo's 
fondness tor personification, and he remarks that, since Philo 
through.out his writings personifies virtues, attributes, the 
parts of the soul:-, time, space, historical narratives, etc., 
we may regard his personification of the powers as figurative.~3 
42. Ibid., Vol. II, P• 116. 




Apparently, he is inclined to believe that Philo did not 
regard the logoi us distinct personalities. -Whether Philo 
uses personifications merely .in agreement with his principle 
that human language is not adaptable to divine mysteries, or 
whether he really believed the powere to be distinct beings, 
we shall perhaps never know. However, I believe his eclectic 
and harmoniz~ng tendencies led him into a difficulty which he 
hi~self did not know how to solve. Had he not borrowed from, 
and tried to harmonize, so .many diverse systems of thought, 
he would have been spared some difficult problems. 
In regard to .these 'divine powers or logoi, we must notice 
briefly four sources from which Philo borrowed. In the first 
place> he is .largely indebted to Plato, particularly, Plato's 
doctrine of ideas. The best passage, showing the resemble~~e 
of Philo's powers to Plato's ideas, at least in their function 
on the universe, is found in his treatise On the Creation. In 
describing the manner in which God created the universe, 
Philo says: 
"For God, being God, assumed that a beautiful copy 
would never be produced apart from a beautiful 
pattern, and that no object of perception would be 
faultless whioh was not made in the likeness ot an 
original discerned only by the intellect. So when 
He willed to create this visible world He first 
fully formed the intelligible world, in order that 
He might have the use of a pattern wholly God-like 
and incorporeal in producing the material world, 
as a later creation, the very image or an earlier, 
to embrace in itself objects of perception of as 
many kinds _as the other contained objects of 
intelligence. . 
To speak of or conceive that world which consists 
of ideas ~s being in some place is illegitimate; 
how it consists (of them) we shall know it we care-
fully attend to some image supplied by the things 
of our world. When a city is being founded to 
satisfy the soaring ambition of some king or 
governor, who lays claim to despotic power and 
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being magnificent in his ideas would fain add a 
fresh lustre to his good fortune, there comes forward 
now and again some trained architect who, observing 
the favourable climate and convenient position of 
the site, first sketches in his own mind wellnigh 
all the parts of the city that is to be wrought out, 
·temples, gymnasia, town-halls, market-places, 
harbours, docks, streets, walls to be built, 
dwelling-houses as well as public buildings to be 
set up. Thus after having received 1n his own soul, 
as 1-t were in wax, the figure.a of. these objects 
severally, he carries about the image of a city 
which is the cre~tion of his mind. Then by his 
innate ·power of memory, he recalls the images of 
the various parts of this oity, and imprints their 
types yet more distinctly 1n it: and like a good 
craftsman he begins to build the city of stones 
and timber, keeping his eye upon his pattern and 
making the visible and tangible objects correspond 
in each case to the corporeal ideas. 
Just such must be our thoughts about God. We 
must suppose that, when He was minded to found the 
one great city, He conceived beforehand the model 
of its parts, and that out of these He constituted 
and brought to completion a world discernible only 
by the mind, and then, with that for a pattern, the 
world which our senses can perceive. As., then, the 
city which was fashioned beforehand within the mind 
of the architect held· no place in the outer world, 
but had been engraved in the soul of the artificer 
as by a seal; even so the universe that consisted 
of ideas would have no other location than the 
Divine Reason [A60ov], which was the Author of this 
ordered frame. For what other place could there be 
for His powers to receive and contain, I say not 
all but, any one of them whatever uncompounded and 
untempered?"""' 
Of course, true to his principle that all Greek philosophy 
borrowed from Moses, Philo ba·ses this doctrine on passages :f'rom 
the Old Testament, giving it· a Scriptural appeal. When it is 
said tha~ "God created man in His own image" ,11-s Philo understands 
this to mean that man was created only like the image of God, 
not like God. In other words, man is the image of an image. 
This applies also to the whole visible cosmos, each perceptible 
44. On the Creation, 16-20. 
45. ct. Genesis 1, 27. 
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object having an archetypal idea, which is its image. He also 
refers to Gen. 2, 4f to support his theory that God first 
-
created transcendental, incorporeal archetypes of all physical 
and material things. Another resemblance to Plato may by 
found, when Philo de.scribes the powers as rays or light, which 
emanate from God and take up their residence as thoughts in 
the minds of men. This reminds us of Plato's world-soul, 
reaching out and expanding in the universe, parts of which form 
the minds of men. The same approach to the communion of the 
human with the divine is evident in both. We may mention here, 
too, that Philo•s conception of God is similar to the Platonic 
unchangeable reason ( v-ov5), al though the Logos of Philo, having 
the two-fold aspect of inward, subjective and outward, objective 
functions, is more active in the world, These outward, objective 
activities are the logoi. Thus, in relation to the world, 
Philo read into his doctrine of intermediate beings all the 
leading thoughts of Plato's theory. 
Another source which contributed to the formulation of 
Philo's doctrine of divine powers is the Old Testament doctrine 
of angels. It is not clear whether Philo identified angels 
~no. powers, but the resemblance between the two is evident. 
Angels were God's messengers and servants; so were the powers 
with Philo. One distinction, however, may be noted. The 
angels wers created, while Philo regards the powers as eternal. 
Furthermore, in passages where the person of God is referred 
to in the plural (actually, the editorial plural)i' Philo 
believes that this signifies the powers cooperating with God 
46. E.g., Gen. 1,26; 3,22; 11,7. 
• 
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as obedient servants. S1noe, according to Philo, these powers 
also assisted 1n the oreation, they cannot be angels, tor angels 
are created beings. But whatever the relationship is between 
angels and divfne powers, it is clear that elements ot the 
Jewish doctrine of the angels are included in Philo's doctrine 
of the divine powers. 
A third source which may have influenced Philo on this 
point is the Greek theory of demons. According to the Greeks, 
demons inhabited the air, that is, the space between the earth 
and the heaven. In this atmosphere they flew about, some 
descending into bodies and forming the souls of men, others, 
who were more pure and consecrated, remaining in the ethereal 
regions for the purpose of serving the Father of the universe.~7 
This strongly resembles Philo's divine powers, which are also 
a host of beings separated from ·God, but mysteriously related 
to Him. 
Finally, Philo was strongly influenced by the stoics, 
especially the Stoio >io'6 o; cnree,µ.c1.r:L1<65, or ao tive cause, or 
which all phenomena in the universe are the result. As tar 
as the powers ~re concerned, they closely resemble the doctrine 
of emanations which was peculiar to the Stoics. Philo, as we· 
have already seen, describes the powers as parts of the Godhead 
that expand or radiate in the universe. This is the same 
function ascribed to the stoic emanations. Both proceed from 
the Deity and beoome the cause of all things. It has been 
suggested that this Stoic doctrine influenced Philo most, s1n~e, 
47. er. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 144 • 
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on the one hand. ange~s and demons were a bit too personal 
for his system.., while. on the other, the Platonic ideas were 
too abstract. being only archetypes and not moving powers."' 
In general, however, we may say that the divine powers ot Philo 
were somewhere between Stoic emanations and Platonic ideas. 
Viewed on their immaterial side, they were divine thouf9).ts; 
in their cosmic aspe,ct they were motivating or efficient 
causes."'" 
The reason tor our concern about the sources from which 
Philo borrowed this doctrine is to be found, first, in the 
importance which he attaches to these powers and, second, in 
the fact that Philo's doctrine was not original. CQncerning 
the former, ·to understand something of Philo is to gain a 
general conception of what the powers or logoi are in his 
system. As Drummond remarks, nwe mee.t these powers everywhere, 
tor they alone give reality and meaning to all to all that we 
see and touch. They are the secret beauty in each humblest 
thing; they are the mighty bonds which constrain earth and 
ocean and sky into the harmony of a cosmos; and since they 
are but the varied expression of the divine energy, it is 
through them tha·t the universe lies unt'olded in the all-
pervading immens1 ty of God. "so Nor could we understand the 
Logos eoncept of Philo without inquiring into the significance 
and function of the ·,powers', for the latter are 1~t1mately 
connected with the former. 
48. ct. Zeller, Die Fhilosophie der Grieohen, PP• ol5tt. 
49. Carpenter, op. cit., P• 299. 
50. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 155. 
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As a matter ot fact, all the powers "proceed from, are 
reconciled by, and are merged in the Logos - the cornerstone 
of Philo's system.n Philo, apparently, was unable to clearly 
define the powers, nor was he able to harmonize all of them, 
yet they are all comprehended in the one Logos, which is the 
most universal intermediary between God and the world. 
As we approach the Logos doctrine itself, one of our 
first impressions is the many aspects under which Philo's 
Logos can be viewed. Drummond speaks of an enormous 11st 
of cla.ss.1ficat1ons made by Grossmann, in which the latter 
lists the many me~ni~gs of the Logos. Consequently, it is 
rather futile to search for a single, definite notion of 
Philo's Logos, for "it is the expression of God in all His 
multiple .and manifold activity, the instrument of creation, 
the seat of ideas, the world. of thought which God first 
established as the model or the visible universe, the guiding 
providence, the power of virtue, the fount of wisdom, 
described sometimes 1n religious ecstacy, sometimes in philo-
sophical metaphysics, sometimes in the spirit of the mystical 
poet."si It is like "a crystal prisro. reflecting the light 01' 
t he C'i<>dhead in a myriad different ways. nE3 In other words, it 
is the complete aspect of God as He makes Himself known t.o 
the world. 
We have already seen in connection with the divine powers 
the influence of the Jewish conceptions of Wisdom and the 
51. William Fairweather, Jesus and the Greeks, P• 190. 
52. Bentwich, op. cit., p, 148. 
53. Ibid., P• 152. 
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oreat1ve Word of God, the Platonic ideas, the Stoia emanations 
and divine reason operating 1n the world. The same influences 
may be noted in Ph1lo's Logos concept, tor by oomb1n1ng all 
these doctrines Philo pr?duoed a kind ot "mediatorial hypostasisn 
between God and the world. Moreover, the same d1ff1oulties 
that were encountered in determining the precise neture of the 
powers are to be met with in the Logos doctrine. In this 
doctrine Philo's ecleotioism is perhaps more apparent than 1n 
any other of his theories, for this doctrine is the center of 
his system. This mixture of such diverse elements explains 
the lack of systematic formulation. Add to this Philo's gifts 
for imagination, his arbitrary use of allegory, his utter dis-
regard for legitimate hermeneutics, and the result is a concept 
that defies understanding. 
To mention a few of the innumerable aspects of the Logos, 
there is, first of all, Ph1lo's conception of the Logos as 
mind, the rational part or the human soul. Because of its close 
connection with man's reason, these two are at times identified, 
and the Logo\ becomes a name for man's reason or tL~derstanding.r~ 
Again, the Logos may mean any abstract or impersonal expression 
of human reason or character.rrln another sense, the Logos may 
signify speech, which is a product or reason. In this sense it 
applies especially to Scripture, tor, according to Philo, 
scripture is not merely the means through which the Logos speaks, 
but it is itself the Logos. Thus, with Philo, the Logos does 
not always denote the same thing. 
54. Cf. the treatise On Abraham, 83. 
55. er. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 158. 
• 
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In its connection with the powers, it will be recalled 
that all the powers were comprehended in the Logos. According 
to PhilQ's cosmology, all perceptible objects are the result 
of the eternal ideas, whose impress or image they bear, so 
that the whole cosmos can be traced back to God's thought. 
God's thought or Reason is the most generic thing, under which 
the innumerable lesser thoughts or ideas are assembled and 
united. It is interesting to see how Philo tries to prove this~ 
He refers to the incident in the Old Testament where God 
miraculously fed the children of Israel in the wilderness with 
manna,s' and Philo concludes that this is symbolic of the divine 
thought of God nourishing the soul. He identities this manna 
with the "word" of God and thus, as a logical consequence, with 
the "Logos of God." s7 
From thi.s it is apparent that Philo regarded the Logos as 
the highest of all. things that have come into being. God stands 
at the head of the hierarchy, supreme, then comes the Logos, 
which is second to God. From the Logos proceed all the logoi 
or divine powers. On this point, too, Philo is not without 
"Scriptura~ proof'' . An example of this superiority of the 
Logos is based on Exodus 25,22, where the Lord speaks ot 
communicating with the children of Israel "from between the 
two cherubim which are upon the ark of the testimony." From 
this Ph'ilo concludes that "the Logos is the driver of the 
powers but he who speaks is the rider, giving to the driver 
56. Exodus 16, 15-16. 
57. Drummond, op. 01 t., Vol. II, P• 160 • .. 
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the orders which tend to the correct driving of the universe." s-, 
In brief, then, all the powers are united and summed up in the 
Logos, for the Divine Thought comprehends all the divine 
thoughts. Since God is supreme, the Logos is beneath Him, is 
second to Him, and is contained in Him. This is Philo's 
conception of how the transcendent God becomes, through the 
agency of a hierarchy of powers, immanent in the universe. 
Viewed from another angle, the Logos becomes the archetype 
or seal which is stamped upon both mind and matter. Philo 
' says that the thought ( Ao005) of the Maker is the seal by 
which each object in the universe has been stamped and shaped.~9 
According to this conception, also the species which we see 
are perfect, being an impression of a perfect thought. Thus, 
we are told that "the Log.cs is the genus under which the various 
ideal types that ~re observed in the universe are classed, and 
that the permanence of specific forms, which till modern. times 
was believed to be a fact of experience, 1s ascribed to their 
participation in the uncbangeableness of creative thought."' 0 
Since man is the highest creature among all the objects of 
nature, he, therefore, has this divine impress in a pre-eminent 
degree. Indeed, the rational soul within man has been patterned 
after the archetypal idea of the divine image and is an 
impression of eternal Reason. 
Philo also regarded the Logos as eternal. In doing so, 
however, he is involved in a contradiction, for if the Logos 
is to be regarded as an archetypal idea, it must have had a 
58. Quoted in Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 161. 
59. Cf. On Creation, 25. 
60. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 165. 
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beginning. On the other band, it the Logos existed in the 
eternal God, as "eternal Reason" or "His eternal ·image, the 
most sacred Logos", it must be without beginning. The solution 
seems to be that,. whether .it is hidden away in the divine 
essence and is thus subjective, or whether it has become 
objective by being imprinted on the universe, the idea is the 
same. Regarded as a law, .,·in its essence it is eternal, though 
not in its applioation. And so, when the Logos is spoken ot 
as "the most generic of all the things" that have been created, 
this refers only to its character of "Word", by which it 
impressed formless matter. In its relation to God, the Logos 
is eternal; 1n its relation to man, it is the beginning ot all 
things. 
These are some or the more prominent aspects of the Logos 
as conceived by Philo. They by no means exhaust the concept, 
but they serve to show in a general way Philo's idea of 
mediation between God and the universe. Other aspects will be 
dealt with m.ore in detail as we observe the relation of the 
Logos to God and to man. 
We have already viewed Philo's doctrine of God. Recalling 
this to mind, we proceed to place the Logos in its relation to 
the doctrine ot God. In this respect the Logos is variously 
referred to as the Reason of God, the Son of God and the image 
ot God. Here also we have the two-fold meaning - on the one 
hand, it appears as an attribute of God, as identical with 
divine Reason, on the other, as a aelt-suff1c1ent being, a 
distinct personality. 
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It is clear that Philo re@llrded the Logos as the Reason 
of God. Offhand, we might recognize in this conception an 
opportunity to accuse Philo of an inconsistency, for how oan 
he pretend to exp.lain the Reason ot God when his primary 
assumption 1s ·that God is incomprehensible. He resolves the 
difficulty by saying that we know God through the predicates 
ascribed to Him as they are manifested in the universe." 
Having already dwelt upon the divine powers, we have seen that 
all these forces are merged into two chief powers - God's 
goodness and His sovereignty. These two are in turn the 
products of the Logos or rational power, from which all things 
have their cause. In this respect, then, the Logos is thought 
of as Reason - Reason in God and Reason in the universe. God 
Himself is not identified with Reason, tor He transcends, and 
includes more than, Reason; but Reason is one of God's modes, 
or one ot the manifestations or His Being. Mankind depends 
upon the Logos, this Reason, tor its own rational power, but 
the transcendent God is over and above the Logos, for Reason 
or Logos depends upon God for its existence. 
In another respect, the Logos is spoken of as the "Son 
of God." There is, however, no similarity whatsoever between 
this idea and the .Christian conception of the Son of God. With 
Philo this was a mere figure of speech to denote the Logos as 
a product of the Self-existent Being. Because the Logos was 
dependent upon God for existence, it is .thought of as a son, 
and this "always in its cosmical relations, that is. as the 
61. er. p. 25. 
- 'Ii -
Thought of God made objeoti ve in the uni verse." ,.i 
Y~t the Logos was also the. archetype of the uni verse', so 
that in its objective relation it became the image of God also. 
In his treatise On Dreams Philo speaks of the human soul', as 
well as the whole cosmos·, as having been stamped "with His 
image and an ideal form, even His onn Word" ( >.0(05 ) :3 On the . 
basis of Genesis l _,27 he infers that. both ~n and the universe, 
created in the iD!,age. of God·, bear the mark of the Divine 
Thought and are thus relate.d to God·. Since man is the highe&~ . 
creature in the · universe·, the human mind, t:P,at 1s·, the rational 
part Qf 1 t ·, is a sort of oopy of the Logos. It is not as 
perfect as the Logos, nor indeed can it be, for the Logos is 
the archetype of all, the image or God. Here again, Philo 
pretends to use scriptural proof, by referring to the words of 
Joseph's brothers spoke~ to Pharaoh, "We are all sons of one 
man!' ,'11 and he goes on to say that, "if we have not yet become 
fit to be thought sons of God, yet we may be sons of His 
invi~ible image, the most holy Word. For the Word is the eldest-
born image of God;n<.5'Thus, all visible things in the universe 
are an expression of the archetypal ideas or thoughts of God; 
which are centered in the Logos, but the Logos itself is God's 
image. 
Here we are on the threshold of a mediating Logos. It is 
the link which connects the transcendent God and the finite 
62. Drummond, op. eit., Vol. II, p. 185. 
63. On Dreams, II, 45. 
64. Genesis 42, 11. 
65. on the Confusion of Tongues, 147. 
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universe. In the mediating aspect ot Philo's Logos there is 
summed up for us practically all that Philo has to say about 
the absolute essence ot God as opposed to His revelation in 
the world. Through this mediating Logos Philo tries to 
harmonize the transcendence and the immanence ot God. The 
Logos is, on the one hand, closely related to God, because it 
comes from Him and ·depends upon Him for existence and energy. 
On the other band, it is intimately conneoted with the world, 
for it gives reality and activity to the visible things in the 
universe. That it occupies a middle position 18 seen from the 
fact that it is neither uncreated like God, nor created like 
the visible things. Philo is aware or this when he says, 
"To His Word, His chief messenger, highest in age 
and honour, the Father of all has given the special 
prerogative, to stand on the border and separate the 
creature from the Creator. This same Word both 
pleads with the immortal as suppliant for afflicted 
mortality and acts as ambassador of the ruler to 
the subject. He glories in this prerogative and 
proudly describes it in these words, 'and I stood 
between the Lord and you'," that is neither 
uncreated as God, nor created as you, but midway 
between the two extremes, a surety to both sides; 
to the parent, pledging the creature that it 
should never altogether rebel against the rein and 
choose disorder rather than order; to the child, 
warranting his hopes that the merciful God will 
never forgot His own work. For I am the harbinger 
of peace to creation from that God whose will is to 
bring wars to an end, who is ever the guardian of 
peace. "''7 
There is a difficulty here, of course, in the form ot an 
unreasonable statement, for our minds cannot conceive ot anything 
that is at once created and uncreated. Indeed, this is the orux 
of Ph1lo's doctrine of the Logos. Despite all his imagination, 
60. Deu t. 5, 5. 
67. Who is the Heir of Divine Things, 205-206. 
• 
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his ingenuity, his allegorical interpretation, this difficulty 
remained unsolved. He certainly must have recognized such a 
glaring discrepancy, yet he .was unable to resolve it. The 
mediating Logos was a oonvenlent, though not always a consistent, 
instrument for his system, so that the difficulties apparently 
did not bother him over-much. It was his way· of explaining· 
the creative and .the regal aotlvity of God in the universe, 
the harmony between .transcendence and immanence. "The Logos, 
therefore, is not a demiurge who aots fo.r or instead of God, 
but it is God's own rational energy acting upon matter; and 
as a material world cannot, like a human work, be finished oft 
and 1.eft to itself, this energy 1s always there, and links the 
cosmos to the infinite source of power and order."~e 
In its relation to man th~ Logos exercises the function 
of a moral law. In its physical aspect it gives reality to all 
the objects of creation and has control over all the ideal 
types, so that, in reality, it is the supreme cosmical law or 
power.'9 Now, by the analogy of microcosm and macrocosm, the 
·human soul also has a rational power or reason, the counterpart 
ot the universal reason. But since our own reason often errs, 
we designate the universal reason as "right reason" or "the 
reason of nature", since this is unchangeable and cannot err. 70 
This law of nature is the Logos. In its relation to human 
beings this unchangeable cosmical law becomes a moral law, and 
we readily see the resemblance to the Stoic principle, "Live 
as. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 193. 
69. Here we note the resemblance between Philo's LogQs 
that of Heraclitus (the Logos as a law ot the universe) and 
Stoios (the Logos as a oosmioal power). 




conformably to nature." The substance ot Philo's argument tor 
this principle is found in the tollow1ng passage: 
"Now since every well-ordered eta te has a 
constitution, the citizen of the world enjoyed of 
necessity tbe sam~ constitution as did the whole 
world: and this constitution is nature's right 
relation, more properly called an •ordinance', 
or 'dispensation', seeing it as a divine law, 
in accordance ,11 t}:l which there was duly 
apportioned to all existences that rightly 
falls to them severally." ,,, 
Apparently, then, when one follows the law or nature, 
he is following God, since "'law is nothing but divine reason 
enjoining what ·is right and forbidding what is wrong', so that 
in doing the law we do the Logos, and our supreme end is to 
follow God." 1~ 
In another aspect, the Logos is the bond of the universe. 
Not only has it given form and reality to the objects in the 
universe, but it has distributed them in such a way that there 
is order and relation among them. It has separated all things 
into genus and species, giving them order and arrangement. In 
this respect, too, it is the sum-total of all the powers, since 
all the various powers which. act upon the objects of the 
universe must necessarily be dependent upon the Logos, because 
the Logos controls these objects. In a passage in his t~eat1se 
Ou Dreams Philo illustrates this by comparing the universe to 
a temple of God, in whioh the Logos serves as a high-priest. 73 
In this capacity it ministers to all the parts of the universe, 
holding them together and preventing them from disintegrating 
71. On Creation, 143. 
72. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 167. 
73. er. on Dreams, I, 213ff. 
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into formless matter, so that the Creator brought order out 
of disorder and contusion, and established the universe "upon 
the mighty Word who is My viceroy." 111 
A ·~hird aspect of Philo' s Logos in 1 ts relation to the 
universe is this that it appears to be two-fold. It will be 
significant to recall at this point the two-fold division ot 
the Sto1o Logos or cosmical power into inward and uttered Logos 
(cf. p. 47). 'l'l1e Stoics applied this two-fold di vision to the 
universal Logos, but whether Philo conceived of the divine 
Logos as being similarly divided or whether it was two-fold 
only in its relation to man is not clear. According to Drummond, 
"two facts ere equally certain, that Philo acknowledges a 
distinction of some sort in the universal Logos, and that, tor 
son1e reason or other, he never expresses this distinction by 
the terms applied to the Logos in man." 7s It is true, the Logos 
is distinguished frora the Supreme Being in that it is ~alled 
f)cdJ w1 thout the article, . or cf e~-rceos a~'1j, but, says Zeller, 
" 111,ar haben kein Recht, den Niderspruch ci1eser Ausserungen durch 
die Annahme eines doppelten Logos, oder einer zwe1fachen 
Ex-istenzf'orm des Logos zu beseitigen, derjenigen, worin .er dem 
g~ttlichen \1esen als Kraft oder Eigenschaft inwohnte, und der-
rt jenigen, in welche er bei seinem selbststandigen Hervortreten 
aus dem gottliohen \f :,r'e . Wesen einging, des "0(05 evotd. cro; und 
. I 
TT€O'fOf!. c. I( 0) • 111' It is said that Philo speaks not 01' a double 
Logos, but of a double revelation ot the Logos. 
74. On Dreams, I, 241. 
75. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 171. 
76. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, P• 623. 
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In its simplest torm the Logos 1s the thought ot God. 
Now this thought may app~ar in. two :f'orms. First, it lies 
hidden in the mind of God, and, then, 1 t is expres:Jed or made 
objective in the universe. Before creation, the intelligible 
world, that is, the sum-total ot all the immaterial ideas or 
archetypes, resided in the mind of God. However, when God 
spoke, the Logos was impressed upon matter, and the intelligible 
cosmos beoame a perceptible oosmos. We should not, however, 
regard the '' inward Logos'' as merely God's intention to create, 
or as only the initial purpose, but rather that "this inward 
conception, which sprang immediately from the creative purpose 
· or God, was the intelligible cosmos, and this again, as we are 
expressly told, was the Logos. n77 There 1s an apparent contra-
diction here, since now the Logos is the thought of C-od, which 
produced the ideal world, and again, it is the intelligible 
world itself. 
The reason for Philo's reluctance to apply the term "uttered" 
to the Word of God may be found in his tendency to do a,vay with 
all an thropomorph1.sms. Speech implies a mouth and several other 
physical organs. But God cannot be said to have these physical 
organs, and thus the analogy breal<:s down. Consequently, Philo 
regarded t~e Word of God as an actual work, "for God in speaking 
created simultaneously, placing nothing betneen the two; - but 
if one ought to set going a tru~r opinion, the word is Bis work."78 
This two-fold aspect of the Logos Drummond has sumL'led up thus: 
"the word and the deed are identical; the utterance is the 
77. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 175. 
78. Quoted in Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 181. 
• 77 -
stamping of the divine a.nd oosm1oal thought upon matter; and 
the Logos, the Word, is the finished work, the Thought of God 
made objective, for the sole creation and the sole reality in 
this material universe is that Thought which resolves itselt 
into a permeating tissue of ideas, and speaks to our reason as 
an expression of the supreme Mind." ?f 
We have already seen that W1sdom 80 1~ an important concept 
in Philo's syste~, and we are now prepared to consider the 
relation of the Logos to Wisdom. This relationship is rather 
obscure and has been interpreted variously. Some writers have 
claimed that the Logos arid Wisdom are identical, others have 
distinguished the two, subordinating the latter to the former 
and re~rding Wisdom as one of' the divine powers, which emanates 
frem the Logos. Whether Philo himself \Va$ clear on this point 
is uncertaint for apparently there is no oiear-cut statement in 
his writings which might show his definite position. 
In the first place, there are certa~n statements ·which seem 
to indicate th~t the Logos and Wisdom were identified. Philo 
uses the two terms interchangeably, particularly in one instance 
where he is rendering an allegorical interpre~ation of the 
Garden of Eden. 81 He observes that the soul is waterd by the 
Divine· Word which "descends from the fountain of Wisdom", and 
again in the same treatise the Divine Word is represented as 
"full of the stream of Wisdom." In fact, the whole· passage 
leaves the impression that the two terms indicate one and the 
same thing. Secondly, Philo speaks of Wisdom in another pla~e, 
79. Ibid • . 
I 80. a-otpt.i:J... 
81. Cf. On Dreams, II, 36ff. 
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using terms and thoughts which we should expect to be used 
only of the Logos.1~ In this instance he is oommenttng on 
Deut. 32,13, and he seems to regard ~1sdom as the highest or 
all the powers, that nhich nourishes the soul. Now this same 
pos1·t1on and function is ascribed to the Logos, so that apparently 
the two terms are identified. In another instance Wisdom seems 
to be on a par with the Logos. In connection with the fourth 
co~.mandment/J Philo, again employing allegory to its limit, 
speaks of God as ·the Father of the uni verse, .and Wisdom as its 
mother, the instrument through which the universe was formed • .r,,i 
Again, there is a mingling of terms, for Philo assigns the 
creative function, which, as we have seen, was attributed to 
t he Logos, to Wisdom. In view of all these instances, it would 
seem that Philo is rather inconsistent. Nowhere does he 
absolutely identify the two terms, yet he ascribes a particular 
function of the one to the other. Now this may be due to his 
special treatment of a certain passage. to a particu~ar aim 
which he had in view, or to a chosen class of readers. And so, 
before we conclude that Wisdom and Logos are identical, it will 
be no more than fair to note an instance 1n which the two 
concepts are distinguished from one another • 
.According to Drwwnond, when Wisdom is represented as the 
mother of the cosmical Logos, "we may t'airly take the latter to 
be the uttered ijord, the former the eternal attribute of God.n is 
82. The Worse Attacks the Better, 115ff. 
83. Exodus 20. 12. 
84. On Drunkenness, 30ff. 
85. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 210. 
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Yet it is not certain that Philo was conscious ot this 
difference, for he never adopted the term "uttered Word." 
Still, it appears that, since Wisdom is the mother ot the 
universe, and ·the Logos, as the seal ot the universe, is its 
offspring, human wisdom 1s subordinate to divine Wisdom in the\ 
same relation as the species is to the genus. This has led 
Drummond to conclude that "the distinction in Philo's mind . \ '"" \ " 
was not that between the inward and the uttered, but between 
the universal and the particular, and that what he meant · to 
teach was that the divine principle of righteous law in each 
of us was the offspring of that cosmical law which 'preserves 
the s ·liars from wrong'". '' 
In dealing with ~his partio~lar point, however, we are 
treading on unsafe ground. Philo is trying to work out a 
rational explanation of the relation between the two concepts, 
Wisdom and the Logos, yet his allegory and his inconsistencies 
in language make him hard to understand. It becomes even more 
difficult to understand him, when he apparently indicates that 
he himself is not clear in .his distinction. How can we under-
stand the position of a man, when the man himself is not clear 
in his thought? Indeed, this is characteristic of Philo, so 
that there 1~ really no formula which renders his position 
intelligible. In the final analysis, about all we can hope to 
accomplish in a study of Ph11Q is to understand the man himself, 
rather than his doctrines. But to return to the discussion. 






significations, seem to be identical. It is true, there are 
instances in which the two apparently occupy dirrerent positions, 
especially in their relation to the cosmos. In this objective 
aspect they are occasionally distinguished. But the over-all 
impression is that there is little practical difference between 
the two. 
Nou, we might have ended this di~cuss.ion at this point, 
assuming that it would be of little consequence to press the 
point, were it not for the significance of the concept Wisdom. 
Philo, too, no doubt, could have escaped his inconsistencies 
and misunderstandings, had he not introduced ~isdom on so high 
a plane and had dealt only with the Logos. To Philo, the Jew, 
hov,ever, this was impossible. A Jew at that time, especially 
such a devout Jew as Philo, was too imbued with the idea ot 
Wisdom to overlook it. The sacred Scriptures made too much 
of "i'lisdom for anyone to discount it. In the Book of Proverbs, 
especially, we note the importance attached to Wisdom. Since, 
·therefore, Philo' s training included a thorough knoi'lledge ot, 
and reverence for, the Old Testament Scriptures, ~iisdom was 
bound to play a major role in his system. It has been suggested 
that Philo, as a result of his allegory, endeavored to find a 
word of the feminine gender, in order to complete his picture 
of the universe as the offspring of a Father (God} and a mother, 
, 
and that, accordingly, he adopted aotp,~ or Wisdom to denote the 
feminine agency. If we recall Philo's fondness for tinkering 
with individual words, this might serve as a motive. Indeed, 





may have prompted him to make use of the term Wisdom. In his 
t»eatise De Profug1s he says: 
"Bethuel, which, being interpreted, means the 
daughter of God, 1s a name of Wisdom. Neverthe-
less, Bethuel is called the father of Rebecca. How 
can the daughter of God be justly termed a t~ther? 
Because tho name ot wisdom is feminine, but its 
nature masculine. So all the virtues have the 
titles of women, but the powers and aot1ons of man; 
for that which is after God, even though it be 
older than all other things, 1s feminine in 
comparison with that which makes the universe, the 
male always having the prerogative. Hence, Wisdom, 
the daughter of God, is masculine and a father, 
generating in souls learning, instruction, science, 
prudence, beau t_iful and laudable ac tiona." e1 
But Drummond sugges t s a more practical reason, a reason 
which seems to be more in keeping with Ph1lo's attempt to 
commend the Hebrew Scriptures to the Greek world. For this 
reason, it is said, Ph11G found Wisdom to be a word more 
serviceable to put across certain ideas. To quote Drummond's 
words, 11It [wisdom] is almost invariably used in relation to 
mankind. It is the divine food and drink of the human soul, 
the dwelling-place of those that love virtue, the perfect way 
of human life, the fountain from which the sciences are watered; 
and even in the few passages where it is spoken of as 
', instrumental in the act of creation, .it is nearly always brought 
into connection with men. It is a reasonable inference that it 
I \. 
is often used on account of its more dis t inct personal 
associations, and because it ~xpresses a source and torm of 
character and attainment which are nots~ well indicated by 
the less definite term Logos." gs Still, in Philo' s system Wisdom 
87. The treatise from which this passage is taken 1s not 
included in Colson and Whitaker's unfinished edition, but the 
passage is quoted in Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 213. 
88. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 212. 
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could never take the place of Logos. To an ordinary Jew, 
Wisdom might serve the purpose, but a Greek would not be overly 
impressed by this term. Now, since Philo attempt~d a 
harmonization of the two systems of thought, he, no doubt, found 
the term Logos to be of more value for his purpose. The Greeks 
were acquainted with that term, and this made Philo's approach 
much more direct. If one were to attempt an analogy, a parallel 
could be drawn between this attempt of Philo and the attempt of 
some of the first missionaries to commend Christianity to the 
Chinese by substituting Christian names for Chinese concepts. 
In other words, Philo found in the term Logos a more suitable 
vehicle for conveying the doctrines of Judaism to the Greeks. 
It was a term more flexible, capable of being understood by 
both Jews and Greeks. The idea, then, that Philo preferred 
Logos to Wisdom for practical purposes does not seem to be 
too remote. 
We now come to an extremely important aspect of Philo's 
Logos, and, since we are again confronted by an issue that is 
not settled, we should, perhaps, begin the discussion on this 
point by asking the question, Is, or is not, Philo's Logos a 
distinct personality? The answer to this question will, 
undoubtedly, help us to form our opinion and estimate ot Philo 
as a theologian. On this question of a personal or impersonal 
Logos Philo's worth as a teacher of religion. All the other 
aspects of his Logos may or may not have importance, depending 
entirely upon the answer to · this question. From a Christian 
point of view, then, the answer to this question is the criterion 
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which makes Philo either a man to be studied or a. man who has 
little significance, as far as Christian doctrine is concerned. 
Of Ph1lo's theology oonta1ns an impersonal Logos, that is, it 
his Logos is merely a metaphysical force or power, then the 
best we can say of Philo is this that he was an outstanding 
pagan philosopher and a great mystic. His only contribution 
to the world's thought would be, in that case, a religious 
interpretation of Greek philosophy. That would be the extent 
of our interest in him. Christianity could never respect him 
as a theologi&n, if he pietured the Medi~tor between God and 
men es an impersonal world force. On the otheT hand, if the 
Logos of Philo is personal, that is, if a distinct personal 
Being is to be regarded as the Mediator between the transcendent 
God and the material universe, then our interest in Philo as a 
religious teacher is aroused. An impersonal Logos .has no 
signific~nce for us outside of its purely intellectual and 
historical aspects, but a personal Logos tends to arouse our 
attention and investigation, because, whereas ~o Christianity 
the former means nothing, .the latter is all-important. And yet, 
even if we were to learn that Philo conceived of the Logos as 
a personal Being, we would still not be prepared to adopt his 
doctrine, since his Logos may not ·be the Logos of Scripture. 
These points we are now prepared to examine. 
It will be recalled that in speaking of t~e divine powers, 
we were compelled to take into account Philo's fondness for 
pe~sonification. and his rhetorical style. Add to this the 
vague philosophical speculation of his day, and his method 
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either becomes plausible ·or it covers a multitude or sins, 
depending upon the point ot view. This applies with equal 
d1rec tness to the. Lo.gos .as personal or .impersonal. The same 
difficulties apply here as did to the "powers", since Ph1lo's 
own statements .are obscure. As a result he is accused by some 
interpreters of speaking of the Logos as a second God, subordinate 
to the Supreme Being, but yet a separate personality. Again, 
he is accused of vacillating between such a personal Deity and 
an impersonal foroe or power. It will be well to keep these 
characteristic~ of Philo in mind, for we can.h~dly imagine that 
Philo, whose entire system is based on the Logos doctrine, was 
himself uncertain as to the personal or impersonal nature of 
the Logos. Of such an important part of his doctrine he, no 
doubt, had an established opinion, even though he is not always 
consistent in teaching it. We simply cannot always take Philo 
literally, because obviously he himself did not mean to be 
understood literally. Furthermore, a literal interpretation 
of Philo on this point, which would suggest a Deity subordinate 
to the Supreme God, would mean that "the champion of Jewish 
monotheism wanders into a vague ditheism. 11 8?w1th Philo this 
would be unlikely. Drummond also argues against a personal 
Logos in Philo, attributing the vagueness and inconsistency 
of language to a fondness for personification which was 
reinforced by allegorical interpretation. He remarks, "The 
persons of Old Testament history become the symbols of abstract 
qualities, and consequently the allegory is frequently 
----·----89. Bentwieh, op. cit., P• 155. 
I 
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responsible for the ascription of personal attributes to the 
general idea. The Logos comes in for its share of this treat-
ment.«f0In his An Introduction to Philo Judaeus, Goodenough 
suggests that, viewed from different angles, the Logos ban be 
both personal and impersonal without involving a contradiction, 
since a demand tor sharp and distinct definitions in our modern 
thought was not charaoteristio of Greek philosophic speculation. 
In other words, thoughts and concepts which may appear 
incompatible to us may have been no problem for the ancient 
philosophers. In line with this argument, Goodenough says, 
"If we are to fQllow Philo rather than ou.r own categories we 
shall have to learn with h"im to answer the questions Yes and 
No simultaneously. If Philo were asked the question he would 
undoubtedly have fallen baok into his pur~r metaphysics and 
denied that the Logos was anything but the flow or divine 
Reality, and that the Logos had no more reality in itself than 
has a ray of sunshine apart from the sun. Yet his soul was so 
warmed by the Logos-ray or God that he often thought ot that ray 
as a thing 1n itself, something which could be made vivid by 
personification, even a rudimentary mythology, as he tr1ed to 
impress the fulness ot his thought and experience." ?I ~"'urther, 
in a disoussio·n as to the personal or impersonal nature ot 
Philo's Logos, one must be rather cautious 1n drawing conclusions 
from the writings themselves, for there are certain passages 
about the Logos in Philo whioh are regarded as spurious, a fact 
90. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 225. 
91. An Introduction to Philo Judaeus, P• 133. 
I 
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which most or the editors of the text.a recognize. u. 
Now. one of the arguments most used to prove that Philo 
regarded the Logos as personal is the fact that he applies the 
term angel to the logoi, the Logos presumably being the highest 
angel or archangel. In one passage 1t is said of the Logos, 
"but let us rather call 1 t an angel or herald" ,13 and in speaking 
of the logoi, he remarks, "which 1t is customary to call angels.n9f 
But if we remember Philo's system or allegory and recall also 
that the Logos is referred to by countless other names besides 
angel, we can hardly conclude that, since it is called an angel, 
it must be personal. Moses, for example, also stands for the 
Logos, as the common reason of mankind. Aaron represents the 
uttered Logos, the faculty of speech in man. Even the priests 
stood for reason in man, the high priest, who presided over 
them all, representing the universal, cosmical Logos. The 
Logos could hardly be all these persons at the same time and 
yet retain a distinct personality. The point is that, if we 
cannot strictly identify the Logos with Moses, the human mind, 
the high priest, etc., then neither can we by purely literal 
interpretation assume that the Logos 1s a person simply because 
Philo calls it an angel, for what is literally true or one 
ought to be literally true or another, unless otherwise 
stated. In other words, we may assume that Philo was not 
attempting to personify the Logos when he refers to it as an 
angel, for, as Drummond remarks, "though the Logos assumed 
92. On this point see Bentwioh, op. cit., P• 156. 
93. On the Life of Moses, I, 66. 
94. On Dreams, I, 115. 
I 
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personality the moment it appeared in finite individual minds, 
1 t · does not a:t all follow that the abstract idea was conceived 
of' as a person."15This latter remark appears to be in line with 
Philo's basic p~inciple that God was transcendent above the 
Logos as well as .the universe, and could therefore in no personal 
way come into contact with anything beneath Him. 
Philo is he~e making t'Ull use of allegory, and the term 
"angel" ought to be understood in a purely figurative sense. 
In this connection we may notice two approaches to interpretation 
which Philo emplqyed. First, he speaks of the aooounts in 
Scripture as h~1;1torioal facts and uses -"angels"; then, he 
allegorizes and uses "logoi'', so that actually "the angel ot 
scripture represents allegorically the Logos of philoaopb.y."9' 
To use an analogy, the Logos may be called the angel of God 
in the same sense that the powers of the human soul to think, 
feel and act may be regarded as angels or messengers of the 
human mind. This rather precludes personality. The conclusion, 
then, seems to be that the Logos is not a person, but only a 
rational energy or force which assumed various personalities 
as it entered individual souls, or as Drummond puts it, "the 
Logos is not a person, but rather an esse~ce of personality 
derived from God and communicated to man, and constituting 
the intermediate link or energy by which the infinite person 
imparts himself to his tini te children." '17 
As ~he image or God and the archetype ot man, the Logos 
95. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 226. 
96. Ibid; , Vol. II, P• 270. 
97. Ibid., Vol. II, P• 227. 
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also appears to be a person •. Here the number seven comes into 
play, ,e for the Logos 1s spoken of as "holy reason or which 
Seven is the keynote."" The number seven 1s regarded as 
representative of the image of Go.d, because ot all the numbers 
from one to ten it alone is neither produced nor produces 
another whole number by multiplication. "It is, therefore,. 
the motherless virgin, who is said to have sprung from the 
head of Zeus, and remains immovable, tor all genesis consists 
in movement. But the elder Ruler and Sovereign alone neither 
moves nor is moved, and consequently seven would be properly 
called his image."100 All things in the cosmos are said to be 
dependent upon the number seven (the seven planets, seven 
stars in the various constellations, seven days in the week, 
seven-told division or the lower part of the soul, seven 
internal and external organs of the body, seven modifications 
of the voioe, the seventh day of creation, etc) ~01 Apparently, 
then, a thought or idea 1s really God's image impressed upon 
creation. It is, functionally, the Logos itself, since we 
have already seen that the Logos is God's image. But although 
it is the image of God and the archetype of man, we would not, 
strictly speaking, call it a person. To represent a number as 
a person would be sheer nonsense. 
98. In regard to fondness for playing with numbers, the 
Pythagorean influence upon Fhilo will be noted. Throughout, Philo 
speculates on the significance of numbers, putting them to as 
much elaborate use as did the Pythagoreans. 
99. Allegorical Interpretation, I, 16. 
100. Drummond, op. o1t., Vol. II, P• 231. See also the 
treatise On Creation, 100. 
101. On Creation, lllff. 
-- 89 -
Again, 1t is claimed that Ph1lo's 1dentitioation ot m.1nd10 ~ 
with the Logos proves that the Logos 1s a personality. But 
this does not follow particularly, inasmuch as we have seen 
that Philo speaks ot the human mind as flowing trom the divine 
Reason. In this respect the Logos is merely the higher Mind 
from which all human reason is copied, the latter bearing the 
stamp or seal of the former, not necessarily implying 
personality, but merely indicating an abstract thought. 
Our final conclusion is that the Logos or Philo is not 
a distinct personality, but only the highest power, the power 
which at once assembles and diffuses all other powers, emanating 
from God and made objective in the universe. This conclu~ion 
seems to be most consistent with the rest ot P~ilo's system. 
Particularly, is it in keeping with his basic principles ot 
transcendence and immanence. An impersonal Logos conceivably 
could escape the difficulties ot contradiction when it is made 
to serve as the connecting link between an infinite God amd a 
finite univers~. But a personal Logos would be involved in 
all manner ot inconsistencies and contradictions, tor in relation 
to the world it would have to be connected 1n some way with 
the universe and yet this could not be, because it is an 
immaterial Divine Being, and, on the other hand, in relation 
to God it would have to be bound up with Him in som.e way, which 
would also be impossible beoause it is lower than God. rhese 
are the dittioulties in which a personal, philosophical Logos 





or revelation and not o:f reason, is not aware of these 
difficulties. 
In its practioal aspect, Philo's Logos is too philosophical. 
It is not as thoroughly pagan as the Logos ot purely Greek 
philosophy, because Philo includes in his Logos concept the 
idea of a transcendent God. He adorns a pagan concept with a 
religious garb. Yet, while this religious philosopher takes 
God into consideration, his Logos concept, from a Christian 
standpoint, is entirely inadequate. Thus, when the evangelist 
says, "In the beginning was the Word, and the Viard was with God, 
and the Word was God,"'03Philo would readily agree, but when the 
inspired writer says, "and the Word was made :flesh and dwelt 
among us, "101/ tqis would be entirely repugnant to Philo. 
To conclude this discussion ot Philo's Logos, we quote 
these words of Drummond: 
"From first to last the Logos is the Thought o:f God, 
dwelling subjectively in the infinite Mind, p~anted out and 
made objective in the universe. The cosmos is a tissue ot' 
rational force, which images the beauty, the power, the 
goodness of its primeval fountain. The reason of man is 
this same rational force entering into consciousness, and 
held by each in proportion to the truth and variety of his 
thouehts; and to follow it is the law of righteous living. 
Each form which we can differentiate as a distinct species, 
each rule of conduct which we can treat as an injunction 
of reason, is itself a Logos, one of those innumerable 
thoughts or laws into which the universal Thought may, 
through self'-refleotion, be resolved. Thus, whe1·ever we 
turn, these Words, which are really Works, of God confront 
us, and 11ft our minds to that uniting and cosmic Thought 
which, though comprehending them, is itself dependent, and 
tells us of that impenetrable Being from whose 
inexhaustible fulness it comes, of whose perfections it is 
the shadow, and whose splendours, too dazzling for all but 
the purified intuitions of the highest souls, it at once 
suggests and veils.ff10~ 
103. John l, 1. 
104. John 1, 14. 
105. Philo Judaeus, Vol. II, P• 273 • 
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IV 
Doctrine ot Man 
Thus far we have considered Philo's conception concerning 
the existence and nature of God, and have then examined the 
Logos, which proceeds from God. It remains now to look at 
Philo's views concerning man. We may approach this subject 
from two angles.. First ot all, we shall examine briefly 
Philo's views on man as one ot the beings belonging to creation 
and, secondly, the more important or the two, attempt to learn 
what Philo has to say about man as a moral being. 
In his theory of man as a natural obj~ct or creation Fhilo 
manifests a dualism. Like Plato, he is very explicit in 
ascribing to man two parts - soul and body.' His ideas concerning 
the characteristics ot man's body, no doubt, flowed from the 
theories which were current in his day among Greek philosophers. 
Certainly, he did not get his ideas from Moses. In one or his 
treatises he describes man's body thus: · 
"i'hose who have most carefully examined the facts 
or nature say that the four elements are 
proportionally equal, and that the whole world 
received and retains for ever i~s frame, through 
being compounded according to this same 
proportion, which assigned an equal measure to 
each of the parts. They tell us, too, that our 
tour constituents, dry, wet, cold and hot, have 
been mixed and harmonized by proportional equality 
and that we ar·e nothing more than a compound of 
the tour factors mixed on this principle."i 
It is clear from this passage that man's body consisted 
of the same tour elements out of which the universe was oreated, 
and for that reason was, like the universe, corruptible. 
1. Cf. Allegorical Interpretation, III, 161. 
2. Who is the Heir ot Divine Things, 152-153. 
I 
Turning to the other element oonsti tu ting man's make-up, 
the soul, we find that this, too, is divided into several parts. 
Here, however, Philo becomes somewhat ambiguous, for at times 
ho speaks oi' a three-fold division of the soul, while on other 
occasions he emphasizes a two-fold division. But the d1tf1culty 
usually disappears, if we observe his point or view. When 
referring to the f'Unotion of the soul, he speaks of the latter 
as having three parts or properties - sense perception, mental 
representation (which is the impression of the sense perception 
on the soul}, and impulse (which may result in desire or aversion). 
But when referring to the oomposi tion of th'e soul, Philo speaks 
of a two-fold division, the rational and irrational parts, the 
former being divine, the latter corruptible. In this respect 
.man and the animals differ, for, whereas both enjoy the 
1rra tional part or ·the vital pr1no1ple, man alone possesses 
that higher part, the rational principle. On the surface, then, 
there is an apparent ambiguity in the use of the word "soul". 
I think, however, the distinction may be explained by viewing 
each under its proper aspect - the three-fold division in its 
functional aspect and the two-fold division in its essential 
aspect. or, from another angle, mien man 1s viewed as an 
object of creation, his soul consists of three parts, but when 
he 1s looked upon as a moral being, the two-fold division 
obtains. 
Now Just because Philo is so deeply interested in man as 
a moral being and speaks at greut length about ethics, he 
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usually adheres to the two-told division of man's soul. 3 
Accordingly, our impression of Philo on this point would be 
quite correct, if we regarded this two-told division as permanent 
and established w.ith him. For practical purposes, it is the 
division that he observes. 
As far as the composition of the irrational part of the 
soul is concerned, we have little information from Philo's 
writings. Drummond resorts to one of the Greek fragments, 
however, and says that Philo, basing his views on tbe authority 
of Moses,~ regarded this lower, mortal part of the soul as 
"strictly consisting of air, which is inextricably mingled 
with the blood."s With regard to its function, we may refer to 
Philo's treatise On Creation and there observe that the interior 
part of the soul is in turn divided into seven parts - the five 
senses, and the faculties of speech and reproduction.' Here 
Philo evidently borrows from the Stoics, who also conceived ot 
a seven-fold division of the soul. 7 
But the h1¢iest and sovereign part of the soul is the 
rational part. The most usual, though ·not exclusive, term 
5. Philo's references to the three-fold division of the 
soul are rare. One instance is an allegorical interpretation of 
Gen. 15 found in Allegorical Interpretation, III, 39ff. My own 
opinion is that such a · di~ision was introduaed merely as another 
point of contact with Greek philosophy. In other words, Philo 
occasionally adopted tµis tripartite division (already used by 
Plato and Aristotle) merely as an aoo.ommadat:ton to Greek thought. 
4. Genesis 9,4; Deu~. 12,23. 
5. Op. oit., Vol. I, P• 321. 
6. \117. 
7. er. Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, 
P• 218. 
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applied to this rational part 01' the soul 1s mind ( yov.5 ) • 
Indeed, "it is the masculine portion within us, while the 
irrational part ia feminine." 8 However, Philo himself admits 
that we cannot be too certain as to the exact essence of the 
mind. This he expresses in the following passage: 
"The mind that is in each or us can apprehend other 
objects, but is incapable of knowing itself. For just as the eye sees other objects but does not see 
itself, so the mind too perceives other objects, 
but does not apprehend itself. Can it say what it 
is and of what kind, breath or blood or fire or air 
or anything else? Can it even say that it is a 
body or else that it is incorporeal? Are not they 
simpletons, then, -who inquire about God's substance'? 
For how should those, who kno,v not the substance or 
their own soul, have accurate ideas about the soul 
of the universe? For we may conceive of God as the 
soul of the universe."f 
And yet, in opposition to materialism, he tried to show 
that Moses, recognizing a two-fold division of the soul, taught 
that the rational part was "spirit."· Once again appealing to 
the authority of Moses, Philo says, 
"'lfo the faculty which we have in common with the 
irrational creatures blood has been given as its 
essence; but to the faculty which streams. forth 
from the fountain of reason breath has been 
assigned; not moving air, but, as it were, an 
impression stamped by the divine power, to which 
Moses gives the appropriate title of 'image•, thus 
indicating that God is the Archetype of rational 
existence, while man is a copy and likeness. 11 1° 
This passage is highly significant, because it contains 
a clear picture of Philo's opinion on the rational part of the 
soul. But there is something else here that claims our attention. 
While it is clear from the preceding discussion that the 
a. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 324. 
9. Allegorical Interpretation, I, 91. 
10. The Worse Attacks the Better, 83. 
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irrational part of the soul, which ia shared by the animals, 
is formed from matter, the rationeJ. part, Philo implies, is 
divine, since it was breathed into man by God. In a word, man 
has part of the Divine Spirit within him. This theory of 
emanation, apparently, was an established conviction with Philo, 
for in the treatise just referred to he goes on to say that the 
only reason that the mind of man, being so small, could "have 
room for all the vastness of sky and universe" is this that 
it must be 
"an inseparable portion of that divine and blessed 
soul. For no part of that which is divine cuts 
itself off and becomes separate, but does but extend 
itself. The mind, then, having obtained a share ot 
the perfection which is 1n the whole, 'When it 
conceives of the universe, reaches out as widely as 
the bounds of the whole, and undergoes no severance; 
for its force is expansive."" 
All this, of course, prepares the way for Philo's theory 
as to how man comes into intimate relation with God. It man's 
soul, at least the rational part of it, is of divine origin, 
then it has direct aoceas to God. Indeed, man is but a step 
from reaching God. 
But there 1s another implication. If the sovereign part 
of the soul is of divine origin, this suggests its pre-existence. 
Philo firmly believed this. He speaks of two classes of souls 
that inhabit the air (ct. p. 63). Some, for reasons unknown, 
descend into mortal bodies on earth and dwell in those bodies 
for fixed periods, after which they return to the air. Others, 
more p1.tre, remain in the air, keeping aloof' f'rom all mortal 
11. The Worse Attacks the~ett_t!!:, 90. 
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oontactia Just why certain ones, and not others, descend to 
earth Philo does not seem to explain, nor is he very clear as 
to why some men receive good souls. and others evil. His only 
explanation, according to Drummond, is that there must be "an 
original ditferenoe in moral qual1 ty among souls" .'3 And yet, 
we cannot ascribe any moral evil to any ot these legitimate 
incorporeal spirits. Only those false soul's who "slip into 
·the name of angels", but are not worthy of' the name, oan be 
called evil. 
It is almost selt-ev1dent to remark that Philo also believed 
in the immortality of the soul. The pre-existent soul 
descends into the human body, sojourns there for a definite 
time and returns to the air.'" The benefit derived from 1 ts 
descent is not exP,lained, although it has been suggested that 
"such rare spirits can have come only for the sake of seeing 
and learning; and when they have personally observed all 
perceptible and mortal things, and thus added to ·their stock 
of wisdom, they return to the place whence they oam.e."'s-
Another mark which distinguishes man from the animals is 
man's possession of will. This Philo teaches in the following 
passage: 
"For it 1s mind alone which the Father who begat it judged worthy of freedom, and loosening the fetters 
of necessity, suffered it to range as it listed, 
and of that free-will which is His most peculiar 
possession and most worthy of His majesty gave it 
such portion as it was capable of receiving. For 
12. Cf. On the Confusion of Tongues, 176-177; see also 
On Dreams, I, 138-141. 
13. Op. cit., I, P• 338. 
14. Cf. On Creation, I, 138-139. 
15. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. I, P• 337. 
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the other living creatures in whose souls the mind, 
the element a.et apart for liberty, has no place, 
have been oomm1tted under yoke and bridle to the 
service of men, as slaves to a master. But man, 
possessed ot a spontaneous and self-determined will, 
whose activities for the most part rest on deliberate 
choice, is with reason blamed for what he does wrong 
with intent, praised when he acts rightly of his own 
will. In the others, the plants and enimals, no 
praise is due if they bear well, nor blame if they 
fare 111: for their movements and changes in either 
direction come to them from no deliberate choice or 
volition of their own. But the soul of man alone 
has received from God the faculty of voluntary 
movement, and in this way especially is made like to 
him, and thus being liberated, as far as might be, 
from that hard and ruthless mistress, necessity, may justly be charged with guilt, in that it does not 
honour 1 ts Liberator. • • He [Goo] had made him 
free and unfettered, to employ his powers of action 
with voluntary and deliberate choice for this 
purpose, that, knowing good and evil and receiving 
the conc·eption of the · noble and the base, and 
setting himself in sincerity to apprehend just and 
unjust and in general what belongs to virtue and 
what ·to vice, he might practice to choose the 
better and esche'\'.' tne opposite. n/6 
N'ot only was man, unlike the animals, created W1 th a 
ratimnal principle, but he is distinguished by his mode of 
conduct. The animals act only from instinct and, under given 
circumstances, respond only in one way; man has the ability to 
consider a.lternatives and to prefer one action to another .. 
This means also that, whereas animals cannot be held account-
able for moral evil, man is responsible for wrong-cloing, and 
he ought "to choose the better and eschew the opposite." 17 
These are some of the more general aspeots of Philo's 
conception of the essence of man. Consisting of both body and 
soul, man is in this respect on a level with the animals. Yet 
he ~s distinguished from the animal creation inasmuch as he 
16. on the Unohangeableness of God, 47-49. 
17. or. neut. 30, 15.19. 
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possesses a rational principle, particularly, sinoe this 
rational, or sovereign, principle, is ot divine origin. In 
this respect man_ 1s taken out of the category of animals and 
is regarded a-s ~ moral being with definite reepons1b111t1ee 
and desires. 
From these oons1derations it 1s but a step into the field 
of ethics and to the study of man as a moral being. Here we 
shall see what Philo's views were in regard to man's coming 
into union with God and how man is conditioned, so that he may 
be capable of having communion with the Divine. Here also 
Fh1lo passes from philosophy to mysticism. 
We have just discussed the dualistic nature of man, and we 
need only refer to the philosophy of lllln's creation, in order 
to complete the picture of his appearance upon the phenomenal 
scene. As a disciple of Moses, Philo, of course, could not 
overlook the Mosaic teaching that man was created in God's 
image. Yet, influenced by Greek philosophy, Plato in particular, 
he injects into the words of Moses his own philosophical notions. 
Accordingly, just as every object of nature had its ideal pattern 
in the perceptible world, so man himself was created according 
to an archetype, the generic man, Appealing to scripture, Philo 
says that the oord "created"'' indicates that God first made the 
generic man according to His own 1.mage, while the word "tormed"'' 
shows that subsequently the species, Adam, was molded out ot 
clay. To this theory Fhilo gives expression in the following 
18. Cf. Genesis 1, 27. 
19. or. Genesis 2, 7. 
words: 
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~''l'ha. t what were created in the first instance were 
genera, is ev1den~ from the words employed, 'Let 
the earth bring forth the living soul', not 
according to species but 'aooording to kind'. And 
\Ve find Him in every instance working 1n this way. 
Before the species He completes the genera. He 
does so in the case of man. Having first fashioned 
man as a genus, in which the prophet says that 
there is the male ~nd the female genus, He after-
wards makes Adam, the finished form or speoies.nJo 
In other words, the archetypal man was made in God's image, 
while the earthly man was only an imperfect reproduction or the 
ideal man}' In keeping with Scripture, Fhilo regards Adam, the 
first earthly man, as having been created good and beautiful • .u 
However, this cannot be said of Adam's descendants for the 
simple reason that they were born of human beings, while Adam 
was created directly by God. As a matter of fact, from Adam 
on down, the passing generations decreased in goodness.43 In 
reality, this downward tendency began with Adam himself, because 
he made a wrong choice, having selected the evil instead of the 
good, so that in all succeeding generations "an increasing 
dimness has fallen upon the powers an~ qualities both of body 
and soul.""'" 
Yet this original guilt does not mean total depravity. 
Philo does not teach the total corruption of man. On the 
20. !!!es orical I~te~pretation, II, 13. 
21. Drummond calls attention to the fact that this involves 
a difficulty regarding the pre-existent soul. Philo believes that 
man's soul is pre-existent, but he also says that God breathed 
i nto man the brea th oi lif e. He makes no a t tempt to explain 
this. Cf. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 277. 
22. er. on creation, 135-150. 
23. This entire subject of nan's degeneracy is explained 
in the treatise On Creation. 
24. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 279. 
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contrary, he has a high opinion ot man's spiritual worth. Man 
was created in the image of God, that is, the Logos, and through 
this image or Logos he comes into relationship with God. His 
own reason is a pattern ot this Logos, which is the archetype 
of human reason. Furthermore, the sovereign part ot man's soul, 
being a fragment of the Divine, retains its divine potentialities. 
Even the most lowly and abominable men are not entirely without 
the ability to do good and to come into communion with the 
Divine, if they want to do so. On this point Philo remarks: 
"For when He rains upon the sea, and causes springs 
to gush forth in the depths of the desert, and waters 
the poor and rough and barren soil, pouring on it 
rivers with their overflowings, what else does He 
prove save the exceeding greatness of His own wealth 
and goodness? This is the reason for which He 
oreated no soul b~rren of virtue, even if the 
exercise of it be to some impossible." ~s 
Thus, God has made every soul with some good in it, so that 
"none are wholly desti t~:te of visitings of the divine Spirit".~' 
It is the duty or each individual~ then, to use this good, to 
make the right decisions and to r'eject the evil and choose the 
goodf1 This can be done, according to Philo, because man has a 
higher ~nd a lower nature, which offer the possibilities of 
choosing either good or evil. 
But now the question arises, what, in Philo's opinion, 
constitutes the good for which man is to strive, and what is 
25. Allegorical Interpretation, I, 34. 
26. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 280. 
' 27. Here the contrast between the theology of Philo and that 
of Faul is evident. While Fhilo makes good and evil a matter ot 
personal oho ice, Paul says, ''the good that I would I do not; but 
the evil which I would not, that I do." ( Rom. 7, 19) • 
I 
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the evil that he ought to shun? Regarding the torm.er, it is 
assumed that the highest good concerns the soul, the sovereign 
principle in man, because this sovereign part ot man's soul is 
the determining tactor· in man's nature. Henoe, the highest 
good must be something spiritual, as opposed to that which 
satisfies the body. This highest good, Philo believes, is to 
be found in happiness or blessedness. In the treatise 
On Rewards and Punishments he says, 
"The hope ot happiness incites also the devotees ot 
virtue to study wisdom, believing that thus they 
will be able to discern the nature of all that 
exists and to act in accordance ~~th nature and so 
to bri.ng to their tulness the best types or lite, 
·the contemplative and the prs.ctical, which 
necessarily make their possessor a happy man."~e 
From this passage it is apparent that a state ot happiness 
is the goal of the righteous man. But this can be found only 
through the practice of virtue, so that virtue really becomes 
an end in itself / 9 Indeed, we are told that "the man of worthy 
aims sets himself to acquire day for the sake or day, light for 
t he sake of light, the beautiful for the sake of the beautiful 
alone, not for the sake or something else ••• for this is 
the divine law, to value excellence for its own sake. " 30 But to 
practice and enjoy virtue is to attain to only a portion of 
the highest good. It is excellent for the ordinary truth-
seeker, but 1t cannot satisfy ·the deeply religious man. For 
28. On Rewards and Puniahments, 11. 
29. Whether Philo was "influenced" by the Stoies on this 
point we are not prepared to say, but thera is a resemblance to 
Stoie ethics, specifically, in regard to the virtues. Ct. Zeller, 
Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, P• 219f. 
30. Allegorical Interpretation, III, 167. 
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the latter, it 1s only preliminary to his attainment ot a 
higher goal, whioh is to praotioe virtue tor the sake ot 
honoring God. Obviously, there is a distinction in degrees 
of spirituality, for "in the lower stage of moral progress 
we are instructed not to neglect what is established as 
righteous by ordinance and universal repute, but when we have 
risen high enough to understand the lessons of right reason, 
we are ·taugh t to honour the Father of all" •31 Mow, the only 
way in which ,1e can honor God is ·to do the things that please 
Him, and ·to try to follow Him in the ways that the virtues 
1ndicate!4 And so, our supreme goal is to follow C--od and to 
imitate Him as far as this is possible.3~ 
However, in order to do this, man must at the same time 
overcome the forces of evil. This leads to a consideration 
of the nature or evil. With Philo, the greatest evil is selt-
love. Turning to oneself or to that which is begotten is the 
logical alternative o:t' seeking after God. "He who flees from 
God takes refuge in himself.'' Nor can one claim to be the 
victim of error or ot ignorance in his thinking. No mitigating 
circumstances can be introduced. Either a man strives to 
Follow God or he is guilty of self-love. This Fhilo states 
emphatically in the following passage: 
"We must indeed reject all those who 'beget tor them-
selves', that is all those who pursue only their own 
profit and think not of othe~s. For they think 
31. Drummond, op~ cit., Vol. II, p. 286. 
32. er. on creation, 143-144. 
~3. This living according to God clearly resembles the 
Stoical maxim, "Live conform.ably to nature." 
I 
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themselves born tor themselves only and not tor the 
innumerable others, tor father, tor mother, for 
wife, for ohildren, tor country, for the human race, 
and if we must extend the 11st, for heaven, for 
earth, tor the universe, tor knowledge, tor virtues, 
for the Father and Captain or all; to each of whom 
we are bound acoording to our powers to render what 
is due, not holding all things to be an adjunct ot 
ourselves, bu.t rather ourselves an adjunct of all." 3' 
When 1t is asked what the sources of all evil are, Philo 
gives several answers. To begin with, the most general source 
or evil is attributed to ·the rao t that man belongs to the 
phenomenal world and is thus exposed to evil. God, of course, 
is eternal and holy, and by contrast everything finite is 
transient and corrupt. Yet, aooording to Philo, man 1~ not 
altogether sinful, because he has the element or the Divine in 
the sovereign part of his soul. Moreover, by virtue of this 
"reason" within him, man has the privilege and the ability to 
choose between goodness and evil. If he chooses evil, it is 
only because he has beoome too closely associated with the 
mortal element, which is the body. NQ~ this mortal element, 
the body, hinders man's spiritual aspirations, not because it 
is material, but because "it 1s phenomenal, transient, mortal, 
and therefore antithetic to that ,vorld of eternal ideas amid 
which reason lives, and where alone the virtues ·oan b~ won." 35 
Apparently, .Philo was not ready to ascribe evil to matter. 
Indeed, this would be ·contrary to his principle that everything 
that God made was good. Matter itself, being pre-existent, was 
not 1ntr1ns1oally evil. Nor, as we have seen, did it become 
evil through any such thins a~ a Fall, beoause, aooording 
34. On the Unchangeableness of God, 19. 
35. Drummond, op. oi t., Vol. II, ·P• 297. 
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to Philo, man's degeneracy 1s due only to his exercise ot the 
wrong oho1ce. And so, it is only because the body is phenomenal 
that 1t is opposed to the soul. Of course, this is purely 
philosophical reasoning and does not agree with the Scriptural 
account of man's Fall. Man's goal is to escape from 
participation in the phen()JJlenal existence and to strive to ee 
associated with the incorporeal and incorruptible life. This 
means that the senses are not only to be controlled, but they 
are to be abandoned. 3" 
In a practical way, then, the body is only a prison or 
tomb which contains the real man, in which the soul dwells as 
a sojourner.37 It is not merely passive or neutral in the strites 
and battles between wickedness and goodness, but it is a 
definite hindrance, preventing man's soul trom enjoying the 
freedom of full communion with God. In this respect the body 
is evil, "not intrinsically, but because it acts as an impediment 
to the higher aspirations of' the soul, and, through its 
necessities, draws off our attention, and sometimes our allegiance, 
from that which is spiritual. 38 
Now, if the body itself, because of its association with 
the phenomenal world, is evil, hou much more evil are not the 
lesser things attached to this worldl Again, moral evil is 
not inherent in these things ( for eve.ry_thing that God made was 
good), but they become evil when the soul attaches more importance 
to them the.n to God, or when we "make them rather than reason 
36. Allegorical Interpretation, III, 151ft. 
37. Allegorical Interpretation, III, 69. 
38. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 299. 
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a standard ot reterenoe .• " Thus. the senses and the passions, 
too, can be definite hindrances in man's spiritual lite. In the 
same treatise, to which we have eeen lately referring, Fhilo 
speaks of the passions as being neither aorally good nor morally 
bad, but occupying a neutral position!' Evil men use them ae 
ends in themselves; righteous men reeard them only as necessities. 
Accordingly, the passions are evil, not 1n themselves, but 1n 
the use that is made of them. It will not be necessary to go 
into Phiio•s psychology of the passions, yet it should be noted 
that Philo recognizes two kinds - good and bad. The former he 
calls ra·tional and the latter irrational,"0 which, in view ot 
wha ·t has been said above about the difference between the 
rational and the irrational elements, explains why they are good 
and bad. In general, however, all passions are to be checked, 
because they are opposed to reason and sober judgment, because 
they too easily lead men to regard them as ends in themselves. 
The highest good of the soul is to know God, but the passions 
obscure this knorvledge. 
Another source of evil is ignorance, of which there are 
two kinds. From simple ignorance men may oommit evil deeds 
involuntarily, which oould not be re~rded as having merit or 
demerit. The same may be said of praiseworthy actions. Whether 
Hlilo intends to exouse wicked acts on the ground of ignorance 
is not clear, but he believes that for this reason we have a 
conscience within us, which is an unerring accuser and judge. 
According to Drummond, "Philo's own opinion was that the 
39. Allego~1cal Interpretatio~, III, 67-68. 
40. Drummond, op. 01~ •• Vol. II, P• 303t. 
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wrongfulness of acts remained, and that actions might, in the 
abstract, be classified as right and wrong, although, when they 
were done in ignorance, one could not attach merit or demerit 
to the individual performing them." 141 The other kind of ignorance 
1s the result of soph1stioat1on and false conceit, and this 
produces voluntary acts of wrong, which are, of course, sinful. 
For these man is held aocountable. 
From the progress or the foregoing discussion we have 
arrived at the oonolusion that, according to Philo, man 1s 
inherently, at least potentially, good. He has freedom of 
choice and can elevate himself to the height of beholding God. 
By quenching the desires and passions, the soul can come into 
intimate communion with the Divine and can attain virtue. In 
refJlrd to the latter, Philo speaks of three methods by which 
virtue may be attained, and 1n an allegort he sets up the three 
patriarchs as examples."~ Abraham, it is said, symbolizes 
instruction or learning. Through a process or education Abraham 
was led to God, and was rewarded with faith. Isaac chose a 
different way. He symbolizes intuition or self-taught wisdom, 
and his reward was continual joy in God. J·acob chose the way 
of asceticism and laborious practice. This is the method 
employed by all those who are not entirely free from the passions. 
But it has its reward, for Jacob's name was changed to Israel, 
the name of perfection, which means "the vision of God." And 
so all three arrived at the same goal, "the direct or mystic 
vision of God", but ·they used different means, according to 
41. Drummond, op. cit., Vo1. II, P• 294. 
42. Cf. On the Change of Names, 88. 
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their own individual nature. 
But before drawing our final conclusion as to Ph1lo's way 
or salvation (if suoh it can be called), it should be noted 
that Philo considers God also to be an active agent in man's 
attainment of virtue. While adhering generally to the Stoic 
principle that the man who follows reason arrives at virtue, 
Philo differs in cne point, in that he regards man as needing 
God's help to escape from the senses and the passions. This 
does not contradict anything that has been said. Rather, it 
agrees with the principles of his system, particularly, with 
the function of the Logos, whose duty it is to guide man in 
the paths of right reason. Since the Logos is reason or the 
law, it acts as an ally to man, oharting the proper course 
along wb1oh man shou1d walk. This is expressed thus: 
11For 1 t must needs be that while· the perfect man 
moves of himself towardo virtuous actions, the 
man who is practicing should do so with the aid 
of reason [11l0 ovJ which g1 ves hirn guidance what he 
should do, obedience to whose directions is a 
noble thing." 43 
Accordingly, the Pentateuch itself beoame a group of logoi, 
or divine thoughts, whose purpose is to guide men. In this 
connection Philo even speaks of the grace of God, which moves 
the soul to pleasant thoughts and bestows love for acquiring 
the morally good/" It is not due entirely to man himself that 
he attains the virtues, but "it is Go<l who through the 
instrumentality of the intermediary powers plants and fosters 
the virtues in the soul of man. ""s And so, man works out ois 
43. Allegorical Interpretation, III, 144. 
44. ~llegorical Interpretation, III, 136-137. 
45. Fairweather, op. oit., ~lt(J.'l.~AFF l\'U.,1v1L}(lAL Llb~I() 
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own blessedness aided by the grace and instrumentality of God. 
We have yet one more point to discuss, and that is Philo's 
view of the final results of life. Here we find no doctrine of 
a future world, for the universe, according to -Philo, will not 
be destroyed. Nothing in creation dies because everything was 
made good and beautiful and remains incorruptible!' With Philo, 
the law of retribution 1-s absolute, so that "a wicked man will 
not lose the reward of a single good deed, theugh accompanied 
by so many that are evil, nor may a good man rely upon his 
numero~s good deeds to free him from chastisement, if in any 
instance he acted wickedly; for God renders everything by balance 
and weight."~7 Thus, the wicked man is given up to his own desires 
and pleasures a.nd lives a life of' sin. . The commonly accepted 
idea of Hades was with Philo a mere table; "the true Hades is the 
life of the wi~ked man, exposed to vengeance, with unoleansed 
guilt, obnoxiou.s to every cu.rse. ""'g The supreme penalty of the . 
wicked man. is seen 1n· these words: 
"That he should live forever · 1n a state of dying and 
so to speak suffer a death which is ~eathless and 
unending ••• so that never by any chanQe he should 
have any pleasgnt sen~at1ons o~ desire anything 
pleasant, and engrafted in him only the pair [ot 
passions] on the bad side, producing grief unmixed 
with cheerfulness and fear unrelieved."~' 
For the rig;1t~ou:ei , on the one hand, there ·1s great reward. 
r.rhis is true, first of all, or· the righteous as a people or rac e.s0 . 
46. er . On Creation, 82; see also Who is the He1·r of Divine 
. Things, 152. 
47. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, ·P• 322 . 
48. Ibid., Vol. II, P• 322 
49. on Rewards and Punishments, 70-71. 
50. er. On Rewards and Punishments, 85-126. 
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They will be blessed with prosperity, happiness, peace and long 
. . 
life. All the people ot Israel will finally be assembled to 
their own land and V11ll enjoy the vision of God.SI It will be the 
final triumph of goo~ over the forces of evil. That Philo's 
speculations on thi~ subject are rather vague can readily be 
seen. Yet behind these speculations can also be seen Philo the 
Jew. True to h1~ Jewisn belief, he ree,arded the people of Israel 
as the chosen race. They are th~ people who will reach the 
ultimate goo~ and nill behold God. But he did not exclude other 
nations from the possibility of receiving this reward. It is 
true, the Israelites had the prerogative, yet all could share in 
these blessings on the condition that they accepted the God of 
Israel and the teachings or Moses. On this account he tried to 
adapt the teachings or Moses to Greek speculation, and to show 
that Moses had the true way ot life. 
When we inquire into the reward gained by the individual, 
we are introduced to Philo's doctrine or ecstacy. The highest 
good which man can attain is to be absorbed in the divine vision 
and to lose all consciousness of self and of the world, to 
receive the illumination of God into ourselves and allow it to 
worlc upon us /l In moments of rapture the righteous man rises 
.51. I ·t has been suggested that in thia doctrine lies Philo' s 
theory of the Messianic hope. On this point I have found three 
opinions expressed. Bentwich declares that "this, i.adeed, is the 
form in which he conceives the Messianic hope." (op. cit., P• 149). 
Ewald also recognizes the possibility that this may be Philo' s 
conception of the Messiah, but he adds, "the Messianic hopes are 
practically dissipated. 11 ( op. oi·i;. • P• 234). Drummond, on the 
other hand, fails to see any traoe of a Messianic hope, and declares 
that nthe identification of the Logos with the Messiah appears to 
me to bs quite untenable." (op. o1t., Vol. II, P• 322). 




above himself and loses his own consciousness "in the ecstatic 
contemplation or Deity." This is the height of bliss, for there 
can be nothing higher, according to Philo, than to commune 
"alone with the Alone." The righteous souls are emancipated trom 
every·thing sensual, and, as a result, they "come to the 
Unbegotten and Eternal, the city of God, the mystical Jerusalem, 
which signifies the vision or peace; and this is nothing less 
than the vision of God himself, fo_r God alone is peaoe." SJ 
As a closing remark, we quote these words ot Drummond: 
nFrom the point of view, then, of mere human 
philosophy, ,Philo deliberately adopts the formula 
of ·the Skeptics; and if' instead or being a 
Skeptic he was an Eclectic, this result was due 
to hi s recognition ·o.f a supernatural source of' 
knowledge in the Holy Soriptures. That knowledge 
of ·the Supreme which the rp.ost approved pllilosophy 
taught to her votaries came to the Jews through 
laws and customs in fulfillment of a divine 
promise. The faith which he derived from this 
venerable .source was brought by Blilo as a teat 
to the great problems of p,iU.osophy; and it· he 
believed that it was possi~le, through a wisely 
direot.eQ. culture, to attain to the clear and 
direct intuition of truth, it was here that he 
recognized the ultimate ground or certitude .. 
The learning of the Greeks only supplied the 
mould in which h1s thought was cast; the material 
was dra,m from the best traditions of Hebrew 
piety. · And while he endeavoured to justify by 
philosophical reasoning the revelations of faith, 
it was always as a Jewish believer and disciple 
of Moses that he addressed his appeal to his 
countrymen and to mankind."S~ 
53. Drummond, op. cit., Vol. II, P• 323. 
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